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ARTICLES 
AEDPA AS FORUM ALLOCATION: THE TEXTUAL AND 
STRUCTURAL CASE FOR OVERRULING WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR 
Carlos M. Va´zquez*  
ABSTRACT 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court read a section of the Anti- 
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to change the long-pre-
vailing de novo standard of review of federal habeas petitions by state prison-
ers. In holding that Congress had denied the lower federal courts the power to 
grant habeas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable 
state court decisions, the Court departed from the provision’s text and relied 
instead on its perception of a generalized congressional purpose to cut back on 
habeas relief and on the non-redundancy canon of statutory construction. On 
both scores, the minority opinion had the better argument. Moreover, both 
opinions overlooked legislative history strongly supporting the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to change the standard of review. The case for reading 
the provision as requiring a departure from the well-established standard of 
review was thus remarkably weak. 
Even if the support for the holding had been stronger, however, the Court 
should have rejected such a reading for a reason considered by neither opinion: 
under the majority’s interpretation, the provision allocates federal jurisdiction 
over the relevant cases in a highly dysfunctional manner. AEDPA (as construed 
in Williams) does not prohibit all federal courts from granting relief to state pris-
oners convicted pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions. Had it 
done so, it would have raised serious constitutional issues. Instead, the statute 
leaves it to the Supreme Court to review state court criminal convictions for such 
errors. But allocating this role to the Supreme Court today makes little sense. 
Precedent and principle support judicial resistance to interpretations of jurisdic-
tional statutes that produce such dysfunctional allocations of judicial power. The 
Court should reverse Williams at its earliest opportunity. Pending such reversal, 
the Court should grant review of at least some allegedly “wrong but reasonable” 
state court convictions in order to vindicate the liberty interests of state prisoners 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to William Eskridge, Steven Goldblatt, 
Shon Hopwood, Vicki Jackson, Marty Lederman, James Liebman, Victoria Nourse, David Vladeck, and Stephen 
Vladeck for valuable comments, and to Jordi de la Torre for excellent research assistance. © 2018, Carlos M. 
Va´zquez. 
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who would not be in custody had those precedents been properly applied and to 
protect its precedents requiring the reversal of convictions infected with non- 
harmless constitutional errors.  
INTRODUCTION 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) has 
been aptly described as “surely one of the worst statutes ever passed by Congress 
and signed into law by a President.”1 
Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, THE NEW YORKER (June 21, 2015), http://www. 
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this law, 
however—the part that keeps state prisoners incarcerated despite prejudicial errors 
in their trials2
See Emily Bazelon, The Law That Keeps People on Death Row Despite Flawed Trials, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(July 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/magazine/the-law-that-keeps-people-on-death-row- 
despite-flawed-trials.html?_r=0); see also Marcia Coyle, Sotomayor Says Congress Should Not Tell Judges How 
to Review Cases, NAT’L LAW J. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202742882 
533/sotomayor-says-congress-should-not-tell-judges-how-to-review-cases/. 
—is attributable not to the Congress that enacted the statute or the 
President who signed it, but to the slim majority of the Supreme Court that misin-
terpreted it in Williams v. Taylor.3 The statute added § 2254(d)(1) to Title 28 of the 
U.S. Code, which bars the federal courts from granting habeas corpus relief to state 
prisoners if their claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court and the state 
court’s decision was neither “contrary to” nor “involve[d] an unreasonable applica-
tion of” clearly established federal law.4 In Williams, the Supreme Court inter-
preted this section to bar habeas relief even if the state court’s decision was 
erroneous, as long as it was not “unreasonably” so.5 In other words, the Court inter-
preted the provision to bar habeas relief to persons in state custody pursuant to 
wrong but reasonable state court decisions. 
The standard of review introduced in Williams departed starkly from the long- 
prevailing standard, under which federal habeas courts reviewed de novo the state 
courts’ decisions on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact.6 The 
effect of AEDPA, as construed in Williams, is to bar the lower federal courts on ha-
beas from granting relief to state prisoners even if the trials were infected with the 
sort of constitutional error that, according to the Supreme Court’s own precedents, 
warrants reversal of the conviction. 
1. 
2. 
3. 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000). 
4. 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
5. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404–13. I describe the standard in greater detail, infra Section II. The characterization 
of the standard in the text captures the gist. 
6. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501–08 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1280–81 (7th ed. 2015) 
(explaining that Justice Frankfurter’s opinion reflects the way that Brown v. Allen has been understood by 
subsequent cases and best reflects the majority’s position in the case on federal habeas corpus review of state 
court decisions). 
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The Court’s construction of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams is difficult to square with 
the provision’s text, which authorizes habeas relief if the state court’s decision was 
“contrary to” clearly established federal law. As the term is generally understood, 
a decision is “contrary to” law if it is erroneous. Justice Stevens and three other 
Justices would have held that § 2254(d)(1) did not change the standard of review.7 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the majority adopted an unconventional reading of 
that term in order to give effect to Congress’s purpose to cut back on the availabil-
ity of habeas relief and because interpreting “contrary to” to permit de novo review 
would read the “unreasonable application” clause out of the statute.8 
Judged by traditional indicia of statutory meaning, Justice Stevens’ interpreta-
tion of § 2254(d)(1) was the more well-founded. The case for Justice Stevens’s 
interpretation of the statute is even more compelling when one considers a point 
not raised in either opinion: The majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d) transforms 
the statute into a highly dysfunctional forum-allocation rule. AEDPA does not 
limit the power of all federal courts to grant relief for wrong but reasonable appli-
cations of federal law resulting in custody; if it had, the majority’s interpretation in 
Williams would have raised significant constitutional questions. The Williams con-
struction skirts constitutional problems because it leaves intact the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court to review and reverse wrong but reasonable applications of fed-
eral law on direct appeal. 
But allocating to the Supreme Court the responsibility for monitoring state court 
compliance with clearly established federal law is, to put it mildly, not a sensible 
allocation of the resources of the federal courts. Such an interpretation rolls us 
back to the period, stretching from the beginning of the Republic to the early-to- 
mid-twentieth century, when the Supreme Court, through its mandatory writ of 
error jurisdiction, was tasked with correcting errors in the state courts’ interpreta-
tion and application of federal law. The replacement of mandatory writ of error 
review with discretionary writ of certiorari review made it possible for the Court to 
focus its limited resources on the resolution of conflicts among the lower courts 
and the resolution of broadly applicable interpretive questions. The growth of the 
nation, and the concomitant increase in state court judgments potentially review-
able by the Court, made such a shift all but unavoidable. At the same time, the 
availability of de novo review of state court convictions resulting in custody meant 
that such a shift would not be accomplished on the backs of erroneously convicted 
state prisoners. 
After Williams, the Supreme Court can no longer assume that erroneous state 
court convictions will be corrected on habeas review. The Court must now either 
allow erroneously convicted state prisoners to languish in prison (or be executed) 
or shift some of the resources it now devotes to resolving conflicts among lower 
7. Williams, 529 U.S. at 375–78 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
8. Id. at 404–13 (2000) (O’Connor, J.). 
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courts and deciding novel legal questions to correcting case-specific errors by the 
state courts. 
This Article argues that the Court should either reverse Williams or begin grant-
ing certiorari petitions of state prisoners seeking review of state court convictions 
alleged to rest on wrong but reasonable applications of federal law. Reversing 
Williams would be the preferable course. As noted, Justice Stevens’s interpretation 
of the statute was far more convincing than Justice O’Connor’s. Reversal of 
Williams is also supported by evidence not presented to the Court or considered in 
either opinion, indicating that Congress did not intend to bar relief for wrong but 
reasonable state court decisions. The majority’s holding in Williams also saddles 
the Supreme Court with a burden that it is ill-equipped to carry. Avoidance of this 
highly dysfunctional allocation of federal jurisdiction is a strong reason to reject 
the Williams interpretation. If this last consideration had been taken into account in 
Williams, it should have swayed the Justices who joined Justice O’Connor to adopt 
Justice Stevens’s interpretation. 
In the absence of five votes for overruling Williams, the Court should alter 
its certiorari policy and begin to grant some petitions for certiorari by state 
prisoners seeking review of wrong but reasonable applications of clearly estab-
lished federal law. The Justices will have to be very selective in doing so, 
given the Court’s limited resources and other responsibilities, but some atten-
tion to such cases is necessary to avoid the continued incarceration of the erro-
neously convicted and to protect the integrity of the Court’s precedents in the 
field of constitutional criminal procedure. Such a shift would require the votes 
of only four Justices. 
Treating AEDPA (as interpreted in Williams) as a forum-allocation rule would 
be consistent with the Court’s approach to the statutes addressing the scope of fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners since such review was first authorized 
by Congress. From the beginning, the Court has contracted or expanded the scope 
of habeas review available to state prisoners in response to developments in the 
availability of direct review in the Supreme Court. I have examined this history in 
detail in other work.9 To place the current thesis in context, Section I provides a 
brief sketch of the pre-AEDPA availability of habeas relief for state prisoners. The 
discussion shows that the availability of de novo review of state criminal convic-
tions in the federal courts has been a constant throughout our history; only the fed-
eral forum affording such review has changed. 
Section II examines the reasons given by the Court in Williams for denying the 
habeas courts the power to grant relief for wrong but reasonable state court convic-
tions. The majority claimed to be acting as Congress’s faithful agent, but the textu-
alist and purposivist support it provided for its holding were remarkably weak. 
Moreover, legislative history not considered in either opinion provides strong sup-
port for the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bar habeas relief for wrong 
9. See Carlos M. Va´zquez, Habeas as Forum Allocation: A New Synthesis, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 645 (2017). 
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but reasonable applications of clearly established constitutional law. Indeed, the 
sponsors of the bill that became AEDPA assured their wavering colleagues that the 
provision that became § 2254(d)(1) would not change the standard of review.10 
Thus, the Williams majority’s interpretation of AEDPA was unconvincing on its 
own terms. 
The case for the minority’s interpretation is further strengthened by a considera-
tion addressed in neither opinion: as interpreted in Williams, AEDPA functions as 
a dysfunctional forum-allocation rule. Section III elaborates the forum-allocation 
interpretation of AEDPA and explains its dysfunctionality. It considers and rejects 
an alternative reading of AEDPA as reflecting Congress’s view that persons in 
state custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable applications of federal law should 
just stay in prison. Congress did not withdraw the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to 
grant relief for wrong but reasonable state court applications of constitutional law. 
In exercising that authority, the Court will have to make its own assessment of the 
need for federal review in such cases. The Court has on numerous occasions 
expressed the view that lower federal court review of state convictions is necessary 
for effective enforcement of federal rights in criminal cases.11 If the Court remains 
convinced that federal review is necessary to ensure that state courts “toe the con-
stitutional mark,”12 it should be willing to grant review in some cases alleging 
wrong but reasonable errors by the state courts. Section III concludes by consider-
ing how the Court might feasibly implement § 2254(d)(1), understood as a forum- 
allocation rule.13 
Finally, Section IV argues that avoiding the dysfunctional allocation of judicial 
resources thrust upon the Court by the Williams majority’s interpretation of 
AEDPA is a proper reason to reject that interpretation. In construing jurisdictional 
statutes, the Court has never rigidly adhered to the faithful agent model of statutory 
interpretation. Section IV shows that the Court has interpreted the habeas statute 
without adhering closely to the statutory language. Instead, it has narrowed and 
broadened the availability of habeas relief for state prisoners to accord with its 
10. See infra Section II(B). 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 247–49. 
12. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, 
J., concurring)). 
13. My argument here is distinct from the argument in Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New 
Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of 
State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008). Professors Shay and Lasch argue that because the federal 
courts may not grant habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1) if the relevant federal legal principles have not been clearly 
established by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should review more cases from the state courts in order to 
clearly establish the law. I focus instead on the fact that even if the relevant federal law has been clearly 
established by the Supreme Court, habeas relief is unavailable under § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in Williams, if 
the state court’s decision was reasonable. My argument is that if Williams is not overruled and the Supreme Court 
remains the only federal court with jurisdiction to grant relief from wrong but reasonable state court decisions 
resulting in custody, the Court should grant certiorari in some such cases even if the relevant constitutional law 
was already clearly established. Implementing the proposal by Professors Shay and Lasch would not require as 
significant a revision of the Court’s current approach to granting certiorari as my proposal would. 
2019]                                       AEDPA AS FORUM ALLOCATION                                       5 
own views of the need for federal habeas review in light of the efficacy of other 
avenues for federal review. Even when faced with enactments making highly spe-
cific amendments to jurisdictional statutes, the Court has resisted interpretations 
that would result in anomalous or highly problematic allocations of jurisdiction. 
Section IV argues that such resistance is proper, both because the complexity of 
the law of federal jurisdiction makes it unlikely that Congress anticipated or 
intended the dysfunction and because it is in any event proper for the Court to resist 
interpretations that would undermine the judiciary’s ability to perform its proper 
constitutional functions. 
I. THE HISTORICAL FORUM-ALLOCATION FUNCTION OF HABEAS 
With respect to state prisoners, habeas jurisdiction has always functioned as a 
forum-allocation device—that is, the availability of habeas relief has always 
served to allocate among federal courts the responsibility for protecting the federal 
constitutional rights of state prisoners.14 Until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, 
protection of these rights had never been relegated to the state courts. De novo 
review of questions of federal law and of mixed questions of law and fact was 
always available; only the federal forum providing such review changed over time. 
Interpreting AEDPA as a forum allocation rule would thus accord with the Court’s 
longstanding approach to interpreting habeas statutes. The Williams interpretation 
of AEDPA breaks new ground only insofar as it produces a highly dysfunctional 
allocation of federal jurisdiction. 
This Section provides a brief summary of the pre-AEDPA history of federal 
review of state criminal convictions.15 As relevant to this Article’s thesis, this his-
tory establishes that, until the enactment of AEDPA, de novo review of issues of 
federal constitutional law and of application of such law to fact was always avail-
able to persons convicted of crimes in state court. At first, the Supreme Court pro-
vided review through its mandatory writ of error review of state court decisions. 
During this period, the Court interpreted the lower courts’ habeas jurisdiction nar-
rowly, viewing direct review as the proper mechanism for protecting the federal 
rights of state prisoners. As the Court’s writ of error jurisdiction was replaced by 
discretionary review via writ of certiorari, and as the Court came to realize that it 
could no longer feasibly serve an error-correction function, the Court loosened the 
restrictions it had read into the habeas statute, thus ensuring that state prisoners had 
an alternative federal forum for enforcing their federal constitutional rights. The 
14. All rules of federal jurisdiction are forum allocating in the sense that they distribute judicial power 
between federal and state courts. I use the term “forum allocation” to describe the distribution of judicial power 
among federal courts. This sense of the term can be traced to Vicki C. Jackson’s contention that the Eleventh 
Amendment serves a forum-allocation function by allocating the power to enforce the federal obligations of the 
states between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988). The Court subsequently rejected 
this understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 706 (1999). 
15. The arguments in this Section are defended at greater length in Va´zquez, supra note 9. 
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story of federal habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners has long been one of allocat-
ing the responsibility for monitoring state court compliance with the federal consti-
tutional rights of state prisoners as between the Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts. 
A. The 1789–1916 Period 
From 1789 until 1916, persons convicted of crimes in state courts were guaran-
teed a federal forum to obtain de novo review of issues of federal law decided 
against them by the state courts, including issues of application of federal law to 
the facts of the case.16 Such review was available in the Supreme Court via writ of 
error on direct review of the state’s highest court decision upholding the convic-
tion.17 The Court had no discretion with respect to its writ of error jurisdiction; it 
was required to review the federal questions decided against the appellant.18 
Congress did not grant the lower federal courts habeas corpus jurisdiction over 
persons in state custody until 1867.19 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, the Court interpreted this jurisdiction narrowly.20 Most relevantly, the Court 
articulated what became a strict rule that habeas should not be used as a substitute 
for writ of error review.21 As the Court put it in Ex parte Frederich: 
[T]he general rule, and better practice, in the absence of special facts and cir-
cumstances, is to require a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state 
court violates his rights under the constitution or laws of the United States to 
seek a review thereof by writ of error, instead of resorting to the writ of habeas 
corpus.22 
Thus, the Court significantly curtailed the availability of habeas relief for state pris-
oners during this period, but the limits the Court read into the statute were justified 
on forum-allocation grounds: the Supreme Court was the more appropriate federal 
forum for the adjudication of such cases because of the sensitivity of reversing a 
state criminal conviction that had been upheld by the state’s highest court. It would 
be unseemly for a single lower federal judge to set a state prisoner free. Only 
review in the Supreme Court was regarded as consistent with the dignity of the 
16. See Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 649. 
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
18. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 461 (describing writ of error review as mandatory). 
19. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). 
20. See Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 657-62. 
21. See generally James Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/ 
Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2055 (1992) (“Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for a 
general writ of error or other direct appeal as of right.”). 
22. Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893); see also Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290–91 (1898); 
Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1896); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 659 (1895); New York v. 
Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 96 (1894); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 
(1892); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 454 (1891); Wood v. Brush, 140 U.S. 278, 287 (1891); Jugiro v. Brush, 
140 U. S. 291, 296 (1891); Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 , 518 (1886). 
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state courts and respect for their constitutional obligation to enforce federal 
rights.23 
B. The 1916–1953 Period 
Beginning in 1916, Congress amended the statute governing the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction to review state court decisions.24 The Court’s mandatory writ 
of error jurisdiction was gradually replaced by its discretionary writ of certiorari 
jurisdiction.25 As a result of these amendments, most state prisoners no longer had 
a statutory right to review of their convictions by the Supreme Court. 
The scope of habeas review during this period is famously contested, but the 
most persuasive analyses of habeas jurisdiction between 1916 and 1953 show that 
the Court expanded the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction during this period in 
direct response to the “certiorarification” of the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction. One side of this debate, endorsed by Justice Thomas in Wright v. West,26 
relies heavily on the analysis of Professor Paul Bator.27 This side contends that 
before Brown v. Allen, habeas review was available only for claims that the state 
court lacked jurisdiction or had denied a full and fair hearing for the constitutional 
claim.28 The other side of the debate, endorsed by Justice O’Connor in Wright v. 
West,29 was developed by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia,30 and later defended by 
Professor Gary Peller.31 This side contends that de novo review of constitutional 
claims was always available on habeas and that only the substantive protections 
provided by the Constitution in criminal trials expanded over the years.32 
More recently, Professor James Liebman has argued that both sides of this 
debate get certain aspects of the history wrong and has defended an intermediate 
position.33 Liebman maintains that the availability of habeas review of constitu-
tional questions was narrow during the period in which the Supreme Court’s juris-
diction to review state criminal convictions on direct review was mandatory, but 
became plenary when Supreme Court review became discretionary.34 Under 
Professor Liebman’s version of the history, the Supreme Court treated habeas ju-
risdiction as a forum-allocation rule (although Liebman does not use that term). De 
23. For cases so explaining the preference for review in the Supreme Court, see Liebman, supra note 21, at 
2091–92. 
24. FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 462–63. 
25. Id. 
26. 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992). 
27. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 441 (1963). 
28. Id. at 499. 
29. 505 U.S. at 299, 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
30. 372 U.S. 391, 402–03, 409–10 (1963). 
31. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 579 
(1982). 
32. Fay, 372 U.S. at 409, 414; Peller, supra note 31, at 663. 
33. Liebman, supra note 21, at 2048. 
34. Id. at 2091–92. 
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novo review of state criminal convictions in the federal courts was thought to be 
necessary, and when a right to such review in the Supreme Court no longer existed, 
habeas jurisdiction was expanded to fill the gap. 
In other work, I have defended a fourth version of the availability of habeas 
relief for state prisoners during this period, one that bridges the Liebman and Bator 
versions.35 I argued that Professor Liebman is right in maintaining that habeas ju-
risdiction expanded during this period in response to changes in the Supreme 
Court’s approach to direct review of state criminal convictions, but that the rele-
vant cases do not support his claim the shift occurred concurrently with the enact-
ment of the statutes that amended the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.36 
The transition was more gradual than Liebman suggests, and, as Bator argued, it 
was not completed until the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen.37 
However, while Bator was right with respect to the timing of the change, Professor 
Liebman is right with respect to the reason for the change. The expansion of habeas 
relief for state prisoners was the direct result of the narrowing of the availability of 
direct review for such prisoners in the Supreme Court.38 
In brief, my argument is that the period between 1916 and 1953 was a transi-
tional period characterized by disagreement among the Justices about the appropri-
ate scope of habeas review. The Justices agreed that meaningful federal review of 
state criminal convictions was necessary, but, even after Congress made the 
Court’s jurisdiction over such cases discretionary, the Justices disagreed about 
whether such review should take place in the Supreme Court on direct review or in 
the lower federal courts via habeas corpus. Some Justices believed strongly that, in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, only the Supreme Court should under-
take the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and potentially setting 
free a person whose conviction had been upheld by the highest state court.39 In the 
view of these Justices, the Court should continue to perform an error-correction 
function in exercising its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction over state criminal 
convictions. Other Justices believed that the lower federal courts were better situ-
ated to perform such review via habeas corpus.40 The latter view gradually pre-
vailed, as the Justices realized that they could no longer feasibly fulfill an error- 
correction function. The debate during this period was thus about forum allocation. 
The need for meaningful review in some federal court was recognized on all sides; 
the disagreement was about the appropriate tribunal. 
If either the Peller/Brennan story or the Liebman story is correct, the 1916–1953 
period was one in which state prisoners had broad access to the lower federal 
courts to obtain habeas relief for constitutional errors in state court criminal 
35. See Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 649–53. 
36. Id. at 651. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 668 (citing Liebman, supra note 21, at 2083, 2092). 
39. See id. at 650. 
40. See id. 
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convictions. If Liebman is right, then the broad availability of habeas relief is ex-
plicable in forum-allocation terms. Even if Professor Bator is correct as to the tim-
ing of the expansion of the availability of habeas relief for state prisoners, my 
analysis shows that Professor Liebman’s explanation of the reason for such expan-
sion was basically correct: the expansion was the direct result of the lack of avail-
ability of meaningful direct review of such cases in the Supreme Court. Thus, 
regardless of when the shift occurred, the story of the expansion of habeas review 
is very much a forum-allocation story. 
C. The 1953–1996 Period 
Between its decision in Brown v. Allen and the enactment of AEDPA in 1996, 
the Supreme Court adhered to the view that de novo review was available on ha-
beas for cognizable constitutional claims.41 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts 
tightened the procedural requirements for obtaining habeas relief and placed some 
limits on the types of claims that could be the basis for habeas relief.42 The new 
limits had a significant impact on the practical availability of habeas relief and 
were subjected to (mostly well deserved) criticism.43 But these limits paled in com-
parison to the limits imposed by AEDPA in 1996. Unlike the limits the Court held 
were imposed by AEDPA, the pre-AEDPA limits articulated by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts were largely consistent with the idea that state prisoners are enti-
tled to a federal forum for the vindication of their constitutional rights.44 
For present purposes, the most relevant pre-AEDPA limit the Court imposed on 
habeas jurisdiction was the one articulated in Teague v. Lane.45 The Court in 
Teague held that, subject to two narrow exceptions,46 the lower federal courts on 
habeas were not to grant relief on the basis of “new” rules—that is, rules that had 
not yet been recognized at the time the petitioner’s conviction became final.47 
Teague was framed as a holding regarding the retroactive applicability of Supreme 
Court decisions on questions of constitutional law. In reaching its decision, the 
Court endorsed the view that “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional 
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their pro-
ceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards.”48 But, 
the Court wrote, “[i]n order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas 
court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the 
41. See id. at 646-47. 
42. See id. at 690. 
43. See id. at 691-700. 
44. For an explanation of how the decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), is consistent with this 
statement, see Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 654. 
45. 489 U.S. 288, 306–07 (1989). 
46. For a discussion of these exceptions, see Carlos M. Va´zquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional 
Right to Post-Conviction Collateral Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905 (2017). 
47. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306–07. 
48. Id. at 306 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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original proceedings took place.”49 For this reason, the Court held that “new” con-
stitutional rules should ordinarily not be applicable on federal habeas review.50 
At least in principle, the Teague doctrine is consistent with the proposition that 
state prisoners are entitled to de novo review of their constitutional claims. Teague 
merely tells the habeas court what law they should apply in performing this de 
novo review. The state court proceeding is to be tested against the law in effect at 
the time of the state proceeding. If the purpose of habeas review is to provide state 
courts with an incentive to apply federal law faithfully, this rule makes some sense. 
After all, state trial and appellate judges cannot reasonably be expected to comply 
with constitutional principles not yet articulated. The Teague rule also produces 
(again, in principle) a sensible division of authority as between the Supreme Court 
and the lower federal courts.51 Unless the claim falls within one of the two narrow 
exceptions the Court recognized, the role of the lower federal courts on habeas is 
to carry out the comparatively mundane role of ensuring state-court compliance 
with well-established constitutional rules. The Supreme Court, in directly review-
ing state court judgments of conviction, would retain the task of resolving unsettled 
questions of federal constitutional law arising in state criminal cases. 
As applied, however, the Teague doctrine has been rightly criticied as giving 
state courts an insufficient incentive to apply federal precedents faithfully.52 The 
problem has primarily been the Court’s very broad interpretation of the concept of 
“new” law.53 Additionally, the Court’s test for distinguishing old rules from new 
rules blurs the line between de novo and deferential review of state decisions. The 
Court determines whether a claimed rule would be new and hence inapplicable on 
habeas by asking whether a reasonable jurist examining the extant precedents would 
conclude that the claimed rule was already established.54 In Wright v. West, Justice 
Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) argued that this test 
effectively requires the habeas court to defer to the state court’s interpretation of the 
then-existing precedents.55 Justice O’Connor (Teague’s author) disagreed: 
Teague did not establish a “deferential” standard of review of state court determi-
nations of federal law. It did not establish a standard of review at all. Instead, 
Teague simply requires that a state conviction on federal habeas be judged 
according to the law in existence when the conviction became final. In Teague, 
49. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court also quoted and endorsed Justice Powell’s statement from Solem 
v. Stumes that habeas review is required to force the trial and appellate courts to “toe the constitutional mark.” Id. 
at 307 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984)). 
50. Id. at 306. 
51. That is, compared to AEDPA as interpreted in Williams. 
52. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1816–17 (1991) (“Teague reduces the incentives for state courts, and state 
law enforcement officials, to take account of the evolving direction of the law.”). 
53. Id. at 1817. 
54. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992). 
55. Id. 
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we refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules of law, but 
we did not create any deferential standard of review with regard to old rules.56 
Justice Kennedy agreed that “Teague did not establish a deferential standard of 
review of state-court decisions of federal law. It established instead a principle of 
retroactivity.”57 
In sum, Teague retained de novo habeas corpus review for “old” rules.58 As we 
shall see, AEDPA (as interpreted in Williams) not only codified Teague’s limitation 
of habeas review to “old” rules, but also required an additional layer of deference; if 
the petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the federal court 
cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was unreasonable. 
II. WILLIAMS AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy made clear in Wright that Teague had not man-
dated deferential review of “old” constitutional claims on habeas.59 In Williams, 
however, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas, as well as Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia (both of whom had joined Thomas’s opinion 
in Wright v. West) in concluding that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had displaced 
de novo review of old claims that had been adjudicated on the merits in state 
court.60 In other words, they concluded that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had 
imposed the deferential standard of review that Justice Thomas had mistakenly 
believed had been adopted earlier in Teague. 
This Section of the Article examines the plausibility of the Court’s interpretation 
of AEDPA in Williams. Part A considers the reasons given by the majority for its 
holding and finds them wanting. Justice Stevens had much the better of the argu-
ment. Part B considers the evidence of Congress’s actual intent, which had been 
presented to the Court in Williams only passingly and was not discussed by either 
Justice O’Connor or Justice Stevens. This evidence reveals that Congress did not 
intend to bar relief for wrong but reasonable state court errors. 
A. The Williams Majority’s Basis for Its Interpretation 
In Williams, Justice O’Connor relied on two types of arguments to conclude that 
Congress had mandated an extra level of deference to state court decisions—a con-
clusion that a majority of the Justices (including O’Connor herself) had rejected in 
Wright v. West.61 First, she relied on a purposive argument, reasoning that a con-
trary interpretation of the statute would have been inconsistent with Congress’s 
56. Id. at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57. Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
58. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 306. 
59. Wright, 505 U.S at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
60. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 55–57. 
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well-known intent in enacting AEDPA to cut back on habeas review.62 Second, 
she presented a textual argument largely based on the non-redundancy canon.63 
Both arguments are deeply flawed. 
1. AEDPA’s Text 
A literal reading of § 2254(d)(1) supports the conclusion that federal habeas 
relief may be granted if the federal habeas court concludes, using its independent 
judgment, that the state court’s application of law to fact was erroneous.64 After 
all, the statute authorizes habeas relief if the state court’s decision was “contrary 
to” “clearly established federal law.”65 As Justice Stevens noted, “[t]he simplest 
and first definition of ‘contrary to’ as a phrase is ‘in conflict with.’”66 A “decision” 
is “in conflict with” the law if it is erroneous under that law.67 The “contrary to 
law” standard of review is well established in administrative law and is understood 
in just this way.68 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, Justice O’Connor also made a textual argu-
ment, but one that departed from a literal reading of the text. To be sure, textualism 
is not literalism. Textualists countenance departures from the literal or plain mean-
ing of a statutory text under certain circumstances.69 One such circumstance is 
when a literal reading of the statutory language would contravene one of a number 
of established canons of statutory interpretation.70 The majority in Williams relied 
on the frequently-invoked “non-redundancy” canon, also known as the rule against 
superfluities: “[A] cardinal principle of statutory construction is that courts must 
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”71 If a literal reading 
of a statute would render one of its clauses superfluous, that reading is disfavored. 
62. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. 
63. Id. 
64. With the caveat that the decision is now to be measured against clearly established federal law as 
determined by the Supreme Court. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
66. Williams, 529 U.S. at 388 (citing Contrary to, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 285 
(1983)). 
67. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 388-89. 
68. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful” or “set 
aside” agency action that is “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(B). The courts have uniformly understood this language to establish a de novo standard of review. See R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Administration, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Copar 
Pumice Co. v. Tidwell, 603 F.3d 780, 802 (10th Cir. 2010); Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 283-284 (4th Cir. 
2007); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 955 (9th Cir. 2003); Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 
1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 410 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Beauchemin v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 91 F.3d 159, 159 (10th Cir. 1996); Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 
F.2d 1130, 1173–74 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
69. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 40 
(2012). 
70. See id. 
71. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (O’Connor, J.) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Whether textual interpretation based on the non-redundancy canon reflects the 
actual intent of legislators is highly questionable. In their empirical study of 
Congress’s awareness and use of the various canons of interpretation, Professors 
Bressman and Gluck conclude that legislators and their staff “do not generally 
draft in accordance with the rule against superfluities.”72 Thus, to the extent 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy believed that adoption of the standard they had 
previously rejected was compelled by their role as Congress’s faithful agents, their 
reliance on the non-redundancy canon was ill-advised. The canon may be justified 
as a means of disciplining Congress, but it is highly questionable as a means of 
ascertaining Congress’s intent. 
Even on its own terms, the majority’s textual analysis was unpersuasive. 
According to the majority, a literal interpretation of the “contrary to” language 
would “sap[ ] the ‘unreasonable application’ clause of any meaning.”73 The major-
ity understood “unreasonable application” to mean something more than just erro-
neous application.74 If the “contrary to” clause authorizes relief when the state 
court’s decision is erroneous, the Court reasoned, there would never be occasion to 
apply the “unreasonable application” clause: 
If a federal habeas court can, under the “contrary to” clause, issue the writ 
whenever it concludes that the state court’s application of clearly established 
federal law was incorrect, the “unreasonable application” clause becomes a 
nullity. We must, however, if possible, give meaning to every clause of the 
statute.75 
But the Court overlooked the fact that, in its attempt to give meaning to the “unrea-
sonable application” clause, it effectively read the “contrary to” language out of 
the statute.76 
The majority sought to avoid this problem by advancing an alternative definition 
of “contrary to.” That phrase does not necessarily mean “in conflict with,” accord-
ing to the majority, because the dictionary also defines “contrary” as “diametrically  
72. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons, Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); see also Victoria F. 
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
575 (2002). 
73. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 
74. Id. at 410. 
75. Id. at 407. 
76. It is revealing in this regard that, in post-Williams cases, the Court often describes Williams as permitting 
habeas relief only if the state court decision was unreasonable. For example, in Dunn v. Madison, the Court, after 
quoting § 2254(d), including the “contrary to” language, explained that “[a] habeas petitioner meets this 
demanding standard only when he shows that the state court’s decision was ‘so lacking in justification that there 
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.’” Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2017) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 
(2011)). 
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different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually opposed.”77 Thus, the 
majority concluded, “contrary to” can be read to require a stronger degree of con-
tradiction than contemplated by Justice Stevens’s opinion. Rather than merely 
being in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the state court’s decision “must be 
substantially different from the relevant precedent of this Court.”78 
This attempt to avoid the superfluity problem was unpersuasive for several rea-
sons. First, the Court cited a dictionary definition of the word “contrary,”79 but the 
statute uses the word as part of a phrase—“contrary to”—that has its own, distinct 
meaning. The dictionary’s illustrations of the Court’s definition of “contrary” clar-
ify the difference between the word “contrary” standing alone and as part of the 
phrase “contrary to.” As an illustration of “contrary” used as an adjective to mean 
“opposite to,” the dictionary gives the sentence: “He ignored contrary advice and 
agreed on the deal.”80 As an illustration of the definition of “contrary” used as a 
noun to mean “the opposite,” the dictionary gives the sentence: “The magazine has 
proved that the contrary is true.”81 These uses of the term stray far from the mean-
ing of the phrase “contrary to”; the dictionary definition of “contrary to” is exactly 
the one provided by Justice Stevens: “in conflict with; counter to.”82 Indeed, as 
used in the law, “contrary to” is understood to mean “against; opposed or in oppo-
sition to; in conflict with” and “contrary to law” is understood as “illegal; in viola-
tion of statute or legal regulations at a given time.”83 
Second, interpreting the words “contrary to” to require more than a mere error 
of law does not eliminate redundancy. The definition aligns the meaning of the first 
clause with that of the second clause and thus produces redundancy. 
Third, even if the phrase “contrary to” might, in the alternative, mean “opposite 
to,” that meaning is, at best, a secondary one. It is a particularly unfamiliar defini-
tion of the term as used in legal parlance. If reliance on an uncommon usage of the 
term “contrary to” were a permissible strategy for aligning the two clauses, then it 
would be equally permissible to do so by seeking an alternative definition of 
“unreasonable application.” Although the majority is probably correct in noting 
that the more common understanding of “unreasonable” is as something more than 
“erroneous,” the term, as used in § 2254(d)(1), might also be understood to mean 
erroneous. That section, after all, permits relief only where the law was clearly 
established by the Supreme Court.84 One might reasonably say that an erroneous 
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent is ipso facto 
77. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (quoting Contrary, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 
(1976)). 
78. Id. (emphasis added). 
79. Id. at 405 (citing Contrary, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 (1976)). 
80. Contrary, The OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010). 
81. Contrary, The OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (4th ed. 2006). 
82. Contrary to, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010). 
83. Contrary to, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 296–97 (5th ed. 1979). 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).   
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unreasonable. Such an interpretation is supported by the equivalency drawn by 
Senator Hatch, one of the bill’s sponsors, between § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable 
application” standard and the standard adopted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald85 for 
obtaining damages against government officials.86 Senator Hatch stated that “the 
Supreme Court [in Harlow] has held that if the police officer’s conduct was reason-
able, no claim for damages under [Bivens] can be maintained.”87 Under Harlow, 
however, a government official’s violation of clearly established federal law is suf-
ficient to vitiate qualified immunity; the courts do not apply an additional level of 
deference.88 Therefore, as Hatch applied the term, a decision erroneously applying 
clearly established federal law is unreasonable. As discussed below, legislators 
who addressed the issue advanced the interpretation that a violation of clearly 
established federal law is ipso facto unreasonable, in light of the sponsors’ denial 
that the bill would alter the existing de novo standard.89 
Perhaps in recognition of the tenuousness of its definition of “contrary to,” the 
majority’s opinion also sought to avoid superfluity by establishing distinct domains 
of application for the two clauses. The Court suggested that the “contrary to” 
clause does not apply to applications of law to fact: 
Reading § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause to permit a federal court to grant 
relief in cases where a state court’s error is limited to the manner in which it 
applies Supreme Court precedent is suspect given the logical and natural fit of 
the neighboring “unreasonable application” clause to such cases.90 
The Court seemed to be saying that the “contrary to” clause applies to review of 
the state courts’ decisions on purely legal questions and the “unreasonable applica-
tion” clause applies to review of the state courts’ applications of law to fact. This 
separation of the clauses’ domains of application would thus mean that the habeas 
court may grant relief if the state courts’ purely legal decisions are erroneous, but 
may only grant relief for erroneous state court decisions of mixed questions of law 
and fact if such decisions were unreasonable. Such an understanding of Williams is 
supported by the Court’s indication that a state court decision is “contrary to” 
clearly established law if the court misidentified the applicable legal rule.91 
But such an interpretation is difficult to square with the text of the statute, which 
states that habeas relief may be granted when the decision of the state court is con-
trary to clearly established federal law.92 The state court’s “decision” is its ultimate 
resolution of the case. If the Court is reading the statute to permit relief under the 
85. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
86. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,064 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
87. Id. 
88. Harlow, 457 U. S. at 815–19 (1982). 
89. See infra text accompanying notes 159–62. 
90. Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). 
91. Id. 
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).   
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“contrary to” clause only when the state court misidentifies the relevant legal 
standard, then it is reading the statute to permit relief only when the state court’s 
opinion conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. This construction raises signifi-
cant problems in the many cases in which the state courts have not written an opin-
ion at all. The court in such cases has not written an opinion, and thus has not 
misidentified the applicable legal standard. Yet, it surely has rendered a “decision” 
which might be “contrary to” clearly established federal law, as those terms are 
generally understood.93 
Moreover, a reading of § 2254(d)(1) that applies the “contrary to” clause only to 
issues of law and reserves the “unreasonable application” clause to applications of 
law to fact is inconsistent with other parts of the Williams opinion. As the Court cor-
rectly noted, it will often be difficult to draw the line between issues of law and mixed 
questions of law and fact.94 Thus, the Court accepted that the “unreasonable applica-
tion” clause applies to review of state courts’ “exten[sion of] a legal principle . . . to a 
new context where it should not apply.”95 Yet an extension of a legal principle could 
be understood as a legal question. As the Court acknowledged, it is difficult “to distin-
guish a decision involving an unreasonable extension of a legal principle from a deci-
sion that arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of 
law.”96 
The Court also held that a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established 
federal law when the court “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable 
from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to 
ours.”97 The latter situation seems to be an example of a state court applying law to 
fact. A set of facts can be “materially indistinguishable”98 from another set of facts 
only by reference to some legal principle. A court granting relief on the ground 
that the facts of the case are materially indistinguishable from a prior Supreme 
Court decision seems to be engaging in application of law to fact. Yet the Court 
recognized that the “contrary to” clause applies in this situation.99  
Thus, in the end, the Court did not reserve one clause for issues of law and the other 
for applications of law to fact. An application of law to fact can be covered by the 
“contrary to” clause, but only if the facts are “materially indistinguishable” from those 
of a prior Supreme Court decision. The latter limitation, which might also be thought 
to render the decision “unreasonable,” is attributable to the Court’s hyper-restrictive 
interpretation of “contrary to.” In this way, the Court effectively read “contrary to” as 
93. But cf. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98–100 (2011) (holding that the “unreasonable application” 
standard applies to state court decisions rendered without opinion). 
94. Williams, 529 U.S. at 408. 
95. Id. at 407 (describing Fourth Circuit’s holding to this effect and stating that the approach was “generally 
correct”); see also id. at 408 (stating that this holding was “perhaps . . . correct”). 
96. Id. at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Id. at 405. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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“unreasonable,” thus creating rather than eliminating redundancy, and reading “con-
trary to” (as that term is usually understood in the law) out of the statute. 
In sum, the Court’s attempt to avoid redundancy by reading “contrary to” to 
mean “unreasonable” equally contravenes the non-redundancy canon by reading 
the “contrary to” language out of the statute. The Court’s attempt to save the provi-
sion from redundancy by carving out separate domains of application for the two 
clauses strains the statutory language to the breaking point and is in any event not 
consistent with its ultimate holding regarding the types of rulings to which the two 
clauses apply. The Court read “contrary to” to mean “unreasonable,” but it could 
just as plausibly have read “unreasonable” to mean “contrary to.” Section II (B) 
shows that the legislators pivotal to the enactment of this provision understood the 
terms in the latter sense. 
2. AEDPA’s Purpose 
In rejecting Justice Stevens’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) as retaining a de 
novo standard of review, the Williams majority emphasized that Justice Stevens’s 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the well-known fact that “Congress 
wished to bring change to the field.”100 In the majority’s view, this purpose of 
Congress “is significant to this case.”101 
As Justice Stevens noted, however, “there is an obvious fallacy in the assump-
tion that because the statute changed preexisting law in some respects, it must have 
rendered this specific change here.”102 Congress indisputably narrowed the avail-
ability of habeas relief in numerous other sections of AEDPA. For example, it 
imposed a statute of limitations103 and narrowed the grounds for filing second or 
successive petitions.104 Even in § 2254(d)(1), Congress limited the availability of 
habeas relief by narrowing the source of “clearly established” law that may ground 
a grant of habeas relief.105 The section provides that habeas relief may be granted 
only if the state court decision was contrary to constitutional law that was clearly 
established “as determined by the Supreme Court.”106 Congress’s general purpose 
of narrowing the availability of habeas relief can thus be given significant effect 
without giving the “contrary to” language other than its usual meaning. 
The majority’s purposive approach to interpreting § 2254(d) was all the more re-
markable because Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices who have 
been critical of departing from text to give effect to perceived congressional 
100. Id. at 404 (noting that “Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to 
give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law” and that “Congress viewed § 2254(d)(1) as an 
important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved”). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 387 n.14 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
104. § 2244(b)(3)(B). 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
106. Id. (emphasis added). 
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purposes.107 Justice Scalia, in particular, has criticized purpose-driven approaches 
to statutory interpretation on the ground that legislation rarely, if ever, reflects a 
unitary purpose.108 Legislation is typically the product of compromise. Some legis-
lators undoubtedly preferred a more restrictive statute and others a less restrictive 
one. The statute that emerged from the legislative process accomplished something 
in between. According to the critics of purposive interpretation, the best evidence 
of the resulting compromise is the statutory text.109 In the case of § 2254(d)(1), the 
statutory text authorized habeas relief if the state court’s decision was “contrary 
to” clearly established federal law. As discussed in Section II(B), its authorization 
of relief in such cases was clearly important for some of the legislators who voted 
for it.110 
The textualist critique of purpose-driven interpretation has particular resonance 
with respect to § 2254(d)(1). This provision was part of a broader statute, the main 
purposes of which did not relate to habeas relief for state prisoners convicted of 
non-capital offenses; as the statute’s name suggests, the habeas portions of the stat-
ute were mainly driven by a perceived need to cut back on delays in the imposition 
of the death penalty.111 The impending death penalty trial of Timothy McVeigh for 
the Oklahoma City bombing provided momentum for this aspect of the statute.112 
Section 2254(d)(1) is only tenuously related to this purpose of AEDPA. First, this 
subsection applies to all state prisoners, not just those on death row.113 Second, a 
change in the standard of review does not reduce delay; it determines whether the 
habeas petition will succeed. AEDPA reduces delay through other provisions, such  
107. See, e.g., Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783–84 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). Justices Alito and Gorsuch 
appear to share these views. See Digital Realty, 138 S. Ct. at 783–84 (both justices joining Justice Thomas’s 
opinion); Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1988 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
108. See, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). For scholarly versions of this critique, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16–17 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of 
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2390 (2005); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 70 
(2006). 
109. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 800, 802 (1983). 
110. See infra Section II(B). 
111. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC.15,053 (1995) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (“The bill also contains habeas 
corpus reform to curb the abuse of habeas corpus and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and 
abuse in death penalty cases.”). 
112. See, e.g., id. at 15,046 (1995) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (“[H]ad it not been for the bombing in 
Oklahoma City, we would not be here today. We would not even be having a discussion. There would not be a 
debate on habeas reform. There would not be a counterterrorism bill.”). 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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as those imposing a statute of limitations114 and tightening the grounds for filing a 
second or successive petition.115 
More importantly, as its name indicates, the other principal purpose of AEDPA 
was to fight terrorism.116 In light of the statute’s link to the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing, the habeas provisions might have been thought to have some loose connection 
to the fight against terrorism. But the provisions of AEDPA most directly linked to 
the fight against terrorism were those that denied sovereign immunity to foreign 
states that sponsored certain terrorist acts.117 The momentum for including these 
provisions in AEDPA was provided by the bombing of a jet over Lockerbie, 
Scotland by persons linked to the regime of Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. As later 
recounted by the lawyers for the victims of the Lockerbie tragedy, AEDPA 
resulted from “an informal alliance among those whose lives had been touched by 
these two immense crimes—between [those] who wanted to see McVeigh die, and 
[those] who wanted to make Libya pay.”118 “An accident of politics had thrown 
them together. The two issues they cared about were linked only because they hap-
pened to be part of the same ‘counter-terrorism’ bill.”119 AEDPA thus reflects com-
promises not only between those who favored restricting habeas relief and those 
who would have preferred not to do so, but also between those who cared about ha-
beas reform and those who wanted to provide a remedy against foreign states that 
sponsored terrorism. It is a classic example of legislative logrolling. It is far from 
clear that either part of the statute would have been enacted had the other not been 
included. It is thus the sort of statute that implicates most strongly the textualist cri-
tique of purposivism. 
Adopting a restrictive interpretation of the “contrary to” language on the basis 
of an imputed general intent of Congress to “bring change to the field”120 is a 
highly questionable approach to statutory interpretation. It is particularly inappro-
priate for a statute that reflects as many compromises in as many distinct areas as 
does AEDPA. 
B. Congress’s Actual Intent 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion discussed evidence of legislative intent in a foot-
note, which garnered a plurality.121 As noted by Justice Stevens, the footnote does 
114. See id. § 2244(d)(1). 
115. See id. § 2244(b). 
116. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC.15,053 (1995) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (“[AEDPA] contains a broad range of 
needed changes in law to enhance our country’s ability to combat terrorism, both at home and from abroad.”). 
117. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); 8 U.S.C § 1189 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 332 
(d) (2012). 
118. ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR: HOW THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OF PAN AM 
103 BROUGHT LIBYA TO JUSTICE 231 (2001). 
119. Id. at 232. 
120. Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). 
121. Id. at 408 n.* (2000). Justice Scalia concurred in Part II of Justice O’Connor’s opinion “except as to the 
footnote.” Id. at 399 n.*. 
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little more than quote the statutory language.122 Neither opinion examined the leg-
islative history bearing directly on whether § 2254(d)(1) was intended to bar relief 
for wrong but reasonable applications of clearly established constitutional law. 
Had the Justices examined the legislative history, they would have found strong 
evidence that the section was not intended to bar such relief. 
This Part examines AEDPA’s legislative history relevant to the interpretation of 
the standard of review under § 2254(d)(1). This examination shows (a) that the 
bill’s sponsors did not regard the provisions relating to the standard of review as 
the most important of the bill’s provisions relating to habeas reform, but instead 
emphasized the provision for a new limitations period and the limits on successive 
petitions as the main ways the bill would streamline the habeas process; (b) that it 
was mainly the opponents of the bill who feared that the bill altered the standard of 
review by barring relief for wrong but reasonable applications of federal constitu-
tional law; (c) that the sponsors of the bill strenuously denied that it would require 
the Court to uphold wrong but reasonable applications of federal law, and, indeed, 
made clear that the bill would retain the de novo standard of review; and (d) that 
the sponsors of the bill and wavering legislators who ultimately voted in favor of it 
understood that a state court’s erroneous application of clearly established consti-
tutional law was ipso facto unreasonable. 
Senator Specter first introduced the habeas corpus reform provisions with the 
“contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language as part of a comprehensive 
anti-terrorism bill.123 Outlining what he perceived as the benefits of the proposed 
habeas reform, he mentioned the “strict time limits on appeals,” which he viewed 
as “the best way to stop [the] mockery” of undue delays in carrying out death sen-
tences.124 He also mentioned that the proposed bill “severely restricts the filing of 
any successive petition,” “requires that the appropriate Federal court of appeals 
approve the filing of any successive petition” and “imposes time limits on Federal 
judges to decide habeas corpus petitions in capital cases.”125 He made no reference 
to a change in the standard of review. 
Senator Hatch, the other sponsor of the bill in the Senate, also rose to explain its 
benefits. Like Specter, he focused on the “time limits to eliminate unnecessary 
delay” and on the limits to “second or successive Federal petitions.”126 He did note 
that the bill “also ensures that proper deference is given to the judgments of State 
courts, who have the primary obligation of trying criminal cases,”127 but he did not 
explain what he meant by “deference.” His response to some critics’ complaints 
122. Id. at 383–84 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
123. 141 CONG. REC. 9,306 (1995). The text of the provision was similar to that of § 2254(d) as ultimately 
enacted: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted [unless it] resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . .” Id. 
124. Id. at 9,304. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 9,309 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
127. Id. 
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that the reform would “destroy the Constitution’s guarantees of individual liberty” 
suggests that he did not envision a standard that would have barred habeas courts 
from granting relief for wrong but reasonable state court decisions.128 Hatch 
explained that the new bill “will uphold the constitutional guarantees of freedom 
from illegal punishment, while at the same time ensuring that lawfully convicted 
criminals will not be able to twist the criminal justice system to their own advant-
age.”129 Allowing wrong but reasonable state court decisions to stand hardly seems 
consistent with “uphold[ing] the constitutional guarantee of freedom from illegal 
punishment.”130 On the other hand, preventing “lawfully convicted criminals” 
from “twist[ing] the criminal justice system”131 is perfectly consistent with 
allowing unlawfully convicted defendants to be released from their unlawful 
confinement. 
Senator Biden introduced an amendment that would have eliminated the “rule 
of deference for habeas corpus.”132 Biden summarized the difference between his 
position and that of his “Republican friends” as follows: “I said the Federal courts 
should exercise independent review while the Specter-Hatch bill requires Federal 
courts to defer to the States.”133 Biden argued that, under the Specter-Hatch bill, 
“as long as the State court decision could be described by a lawyer as being reason-
able, the Federal court has to defer to the State court.”134 Even though the State 
court decision “may not be right” and the Federal court “might not have decided it 
that way” it will often have to be deemed “reasonable.”135 The effect of this, Biden 
argued, is that “there is no habeas corpus review on matters of fact and law at a 
Federal level.”136 He stated that, under Specter-Hatch: 
[A] claim can be granted only if the State court’s application of Federal law to 
the facts before it was unreasonable, not merely wrong but unreasonable. It 
could be wrong but viewed as reasonable. This is an extraordinary deferential 
standard to the State courts, and I believe it is an inappropriate one. It puts the 
Federal courts in the difficult position of evaluating the reasonableness of a 
State court judge rather than simply deciding whether or not he correctly 
applied the law, not whether he did it reasonably.137 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (emphasis added). 
130. Id. (emphasis added). 
131. Id. (emphasis added). 
132. Id. at 15,056–57 (statement of Sen. Biden). The amendment would have struck language indicating that 
state prisoners could obtain habeas relief if the state court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . .” Id. at 15,058. 
133. Id. at 15,056–57. 
134. Id. at 15,058. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. Other Senators expressed similar concerns about the bill. For example, Senator Feingold objected to 
“the requirement that [the] Federal judiciary defer to State courts,” which he called “a major departure from more 
than 200 years of legal precedent . . . and the most egregious change proposed by habeas reform supporters,” Id. 
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In response, Senator Hatch stated that Biden’s claim that “Specter-Hatch 
requires Federal courts to defer to State courts in almost all cases, even if the State 
is wrong about the U.S. Constitution” is “absolutely false.”138 He then elaborated: 
The fact of the matter is, currently, Federal courts have virtual de novo review 
of a State court’s legal determination. Under our change, Federal courts would 
be required to defer to the determination of State courts, unless the State 
court’s decision was “contrary to or involved in [sic] an unreasonable appli-
cation of clearly established Federal laws as determined by the Supreme 
Court.” . . . 
. . . 
This is a wholly appropriate standard. It enables the Federal court to overturn 
State court positions that clearly contravene Federal law. It further allows the 
Federal courts to review State court decisions that improperly apply clearly 
established Federal law. The standard also ends the improper review of the 
State court decisions. 
After all, State courts are constrained to uphold the Constitution and faithfully 
apply Federal law as well. There is simply no reason that Federal courts 
should have the ability to virtually retry cases that have been properly adjudi-
cated by our State courts.139 
Hatch’s recognition that habeas courts would be able to grant relief if the state 
court “improperly” applied federal law is consistent with a de novo standard of 
review. Hatch also made clear that deference applies only if the state court decision 
was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established fed-
eral law. 
Senator Specter rose immediately after Hatch and noted that he was not com-
pletely satisfied with the language of the proposed provision because a change in 
language “breeds a lot of new litigation to have interpretations of untested lan-
guage.”140 In his view, there would be “substantial latitude here for interpreta-
tion.”141 His view of the proposed standard was that, just as under existing law, 
under the new bill “there is still a good bit of latitude which the Federal judge will 
have when he makes a determination under a habeas corpus petition.”142 He then 
referred to the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language, and con-
cluded that “there still is latitude for the Federal judge to disagree with the determi-
nation made by the State court judge.”143 
at 15,031 (statement of Sen. Feingold). He urged “that the habeas provisions of this bill be removed.” Id. at 
15,032. 
138. Id. at 15,062 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added). 
139. Id. (emphasis added). 
140. Id.at 15,063 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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Senator Hatch took the floor again and stated that the standard in the bill “essen-
tially gives the Federal court the authority to review de novo whether the State 
court decided the claim in contravention of Federal law.”144 He continued: 
“Moreover, the Federal standard, this review standard proposed in S.735, allows 
the Federal court to review State court decisions that improperly apply clearly 
established Federal law.”145 So, “if the State court reasonably applied Federal law, 
its decision must be upheld.”146 Hatch thus confirmed that the language that was 
eventually adopted would not alter the de novo standard of review. He used the 
term “unreasonably” to mean “improperly.” 
That this is how Senator Hatch understood the “unreasonableness” standard is 
confirmed by his citation of cases in the Bivens and Fourth Amendment contexts, 
which, in his view, support “the principle that no remedy is available where the 
Government acts reasonably.”147 The qualified immunity cases to which Hatch 
referred protect an officer from damage liability if she did not violate “clearly 
established federal law.”148 These cases do not impose an additional deference 
standard, as the Court in Williams read § 2254(d)(1) to do.149 Hatch’s equation of 
the “unreasonableness” standard with the qualified immunity standard confirms 
that he understood a violation of clearly established federal law to be ipso facto 
unreasonable. 
The Senate then voted in favor of the bill.150 Even though his amendments had 
been rejected, Senator Biden supported the bill and urged his colleagues to do the 
same.151 He made no reference to the habeas corpus issue. After the vote, Senator 
Dole explained that “[t]he most critical element of this bill, and the one that bears 
most directly on the tragic events in Oklahoma City, is the provision reforming the 
so-called habeas corpus rules.”152 He then mentioned the new filing deadlines and 
the limitation on second and successive petitions as “landmark reforms” that “will 
go a long, long way to streamline the lengthy appeals process and bridge the gap 
between crime and punishment in America.”153 He did not mention a change in the 
standard of review. 
The Senate later debated the conference report (containing identical language 
with respect to future § 2254(d) as the original Senate bill). Senator Moynihan 
introduced a collection of letters and newspaper articles expressing concern about 
the deferential standard of review.154 In response, Senator Hatch again explained 
144. Id. at 15,064 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
145. Id. (emphasis added). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 1047. 
150. 141 CONG. REC. 15,074 (1995). 
151. Id. at 15,073 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
152. Id. at 15,095 (statement of Sen. Dole). 
153. Id. 
154. See 142 CONG. REC. 7,764–69 (1996). 
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that the standard provided for in the bill “essentially gives the federal court the 
authority to review, de novo, whether the State court decided the claim in contra-
vention of Federal law.”155 Moreover, he added, federal courts will also be able “to 
review State court decisions that improperly apply clearly established Federal 
law.”156 At the end of his statement Hatch concluded that “[t]he standard is a good 
one. The deference to State law is good, because it just means that we defer to 
them if they have properly applied Federal law.”157 
After Hatch’s explanation that the bill would not alter the de novo standard of 
review, several Senators who had been critical of the provision announced that 
they would vote in favor of the bill. Senator Levin, for example, said that he 
viewed the habeas corpus provisions as “problematical,”158 but then quoted the lan-
guage of § 2254(d)(1) and explained how he interpreted it: 
I interpret the new standard to give the Federal courts the final say as to what 
the U.S. Constitution says. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. 
First, several Members have raised the concern that the reference in the bill to 
an unreasonable application of Federal law could create two different classes 
of constitutional violations – reasonable and unreasonable. I vote for the bill 
because I have confidence that the Federal courts will not do this. I believe the 
courts will conclude, as they should, that a constitutional error cannot be rea-
sonable and that if a State court decision is wrong, it must necessarily be 
unreasonable. 
Second, I note that this provision permits a Federal court to grant a petition for 
habeas corpus if the State court decision was contrary to Federal law. I inter-
pret this language to mean that a Federal court may grant habeas corpus – on a 
first petition – any time that a State court incorrectly interprets Federal law 
and that error is material to the case. In other words, if the State court’s inter-
pretation of the U.S. Constitution is wrong, this standard authorizes the 
Federal courts to overturn that interpretation.159 
No one, including the sponsors of the bill, disputed Levin’s interpretation after 
he spoke. Indeed, Senator Specter’s explanation of his understanding of the stand-
ard of review was largely in accord with Senator Levin’s: 
The bill continue [sic] to require deference to State courts’ findings of fact. 
Federal courts will owe no deference to State courts’ determinations of 
Federal law, which is appropriate in our Federal system. However, under the 
bill deference will be owed to State courts’ decisions on the application of 
Federal law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a State court’s decision 
applying the law to the facts will be upheld. I am not entirely comfortable 
155. Id. at 7,772 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 7,773 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. at 7,792 (statement of Sen. Levin). 
159. Id. 
2019]                                      AEDPA AS FORUM ALLOCATION                                      25 
with this restriction, but upon reflection I believe that the standard in the bill 
will allow Federal courts sufficient discretion to ensure that convictions in 
State court have been obtained in conformity with the Constitution.160 
Thus, like Senator Levin, Senator Spector appears to have understood that a deci-
sion not “in conformity with the Constitution”161 as clearly established by the 
Supreme Court was ipso facto unreasonable. 
Senator Biden rose again to discuss the language of proposed § 2254(d)(1): 
[I]t seems to me that even under this provision of the law we are now chang-
ing, which I think is inadvisable to change, but even under this provision, if 
Federal courts think that State courts are right on the Constitution, they will 
uphold it. And if they are wrong, they will not. 
So, if a State court makes an unconstitutional determination, the Federal 
courts will, and should, continue to say so. Therefore, I think this is much less 
onerous – unnecessary but much less onerous – than, in fact, it may appear on 
its face. 
If a Federal court concludes the State court violated the Federal Constitution, 
that, to me, is by definition – by definition – an unreasonable application of 
the Federal law, and therefore, Federal habeas corpus would be able to be 
granted.162 
Senator Hatch rose immediately after Biden to express his satisfaction with “the 
action that I believe the Senate is about to take.”163 He did not dispute Biden’s 
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1). The Conference Report was agreed to shortly 
thereafter.164 
The debate in the House was less illuminating but consistent with the above. A 
number of Members expressed their opposition to the bill because they understood 
it to establish a deferential standard of review. For example, in response to his col-
leagues’ criticism of the provision that became § 2254(d)(1) as requiring deference 
to the state courts, Representative Hyde, the Congressman who called up the 
Conference Report for debate, explained that “the Federal judge always reviews 
the State court decision to see if it is in conformity with established Supreme Court 
precedence [sic], or if it has been misapplied. So it is not a blank total deference, 
but it is a recognition that you cannot relitigate these issues endlessly.”165 He also 
emphasized that “[t]he Federal judge still has to look at the work product of the 
State court to decide if they got it right.”166 Hyde believed that the real benefit of 
the reform was that it would “end the charade of endless habeas proceedings,” not 
160. Id. at 7,799 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 7,802 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
163. Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
164. Id. at 7,804–05. 
165. Id. at 7,956 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (emphasis added). 
166. Id. at 7,958 (emphasis added). 
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that erroneous decisions would be allowed to stand.167 When he called up the con-
ference report, he described habeas reform as “the Holy Grail,” but his explanation 
of the reform consisted only of a reference to the fact that “we have a 1-year statute 
of limitations in habeas,” which would end the “endless appeals” up and down the 
State and Federal systems.168 He did not mention a more lenient standard of 
review.169 
The use of legislative history to interpret statutes is a much debated topic. It is 
no doubt true that the notion of a single “legislative intent” is a fictional one. 
Perhaps some legislators interpreted the language of § 2254(d)(1) as the Williams 
majority did and voted for it. Other legislators may have understood the language 
of the provision in the same way and voted against it for that reason.170 Very likely 
there were also legislators who did not much care about and did not have a clear 
understanding of the habeas provisions and voted in favor of or against the bill 
because of its provisions relating to terrorism. As noted above, this is a reason to 
read the statute as its text provides, and the text of § 2254(d)(1) allows a habeas 
court to grant relief if the “decision” of the state court was, inter alia, erroneous. 
The view that legislative history should never be consulted in interpreting a stat-
ute has not yet garnered a majority of the Supreme Court. If legislative debates 
about the meaning of a statutory provision can ever be thought to illuminate the 
“legislature’s” understanding of the provision it was adopting, the debates sur-
rounding the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) would appear to offer particularly clear evi-
dence of the Congress’s understanding of that provision. 
First, the understanding of the bill’s sponsors would appear to deserve special 
weight in interpreting a statute.171 AEDPA’s sponsors in the Senate clearly 
expressed their view that the statute would not alter the de novo standard of 
review.172 Even if the sponsors’ statements to that effect were not sincere, the state-
ments are important in interpreting the statute, as they were made in order to con-
vince wavering Senators to vote in favor of the bill. If the understanding of any set 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 7,961. 
169. Professor Allan Ides reviewed some (but not all) of this history and reached similar conclusions.  Allan 
Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1):  A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme 
Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 693–97 (2003). Ides additionally cites Senator Hatch’s statement 
that “[t]he Great Writ will not be affected by this [provision] one bit.” Id. at 696. I have not relied on this 
statement because Hatch appears to have been assuring his colleagues that the provision would not affect the 
scope of the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus. Hatch explained that “[t]he Great Writ of Habeas Corpus 
contained in the Constitution applied to only two circumstances: No. 1, to challenge an illegal imprisonment 
before trial; and, No. 2, to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The habeas corpus 
we are reforming is the statutory form of habeas corpus.” 142 CONG. REC. 7,773 (1996).  
170. This may have been the reason that Senators Feingold and Moynihan voted against the bill. 142 CONG. 
REC. 7,805 (1996) (recording vote). Senator Kennedy also voted against the bill, id., even though, like Biden and 
Levin, he expressed the view that, properly interpreted, it did not change the standard of review. See 141 CONG. 
REC. 15,024 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
171. See Victoria Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 316 (2014). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 144, 155. 
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of legislators can be said to reflect the meaning of a law, it is that of “those in a crit-
ical position to forge a final legislative compromise and whose assent is critical to 
the act’s enactment.”173 The views of these pivotal legislators are important 
“because they are the most reliable indicators of the compromises necessary to pro-
duce a bill that can pass. Without the pivot’s assent and the compromises necessary 
to gain it, there would be no legislation. These legislative compromises are there-
fore central to an act’s meaning.”174 The sponsors’ assurances about the meaning 
of the statute provide indirect evidence of the understanding of the pivotal legisla-
tor.175 The fact that the sponsors believed it necessary to mollify their concerns, 
and did so by putting forward an interpretation of the statute that (by hypothesis) 
was contrary to their preferences, suggests that the sponsors believed the statute 
would not have gained the votes necessary to pass had the pivotal legislator under-
stood the statute to mean something else. In this case, that means the statute would 
not have passed had the pivotal Senators not understood it as Senator Hatch 
insisted it should be understood – i.e., as retaining the de novo review standard. If 
the pivotal Senators had not so understood it, it would not have passed in the 
Senate; and if it had not passed in the Senate, it would not have passed at all. 
The statute also would not have passed at all if it had not been signed by the 
President. President Clinton, upon signing the bill into law, made clear his view 
that § 2254(d)(1) would not change the standard for review in habeas cases beyond 
limiting the source of law to Supreme Court precedent. Clinton stated that he 
“signed this bill because I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret these 
provisions to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock 
constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.”176 He went on to quote 
Marbury’s dictum that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is,” and expressed confidence that the courts would 
apply the canon of avoidance to construe the statute “to permit independent 
Federal court review of constitutional claims based on the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Constitution and Federal laws.”177 Because the President’s 
173. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political History of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1450 (2003); see also 
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (1994); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 705 (1992); cf. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and 
Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 479 (2007) (“It is clear both that the decisive Republican votes disfavored any 
substantive limit and that, to the extent they signed on to the unreasonableness standard, they did not have any 
restrictionist ‘purposes’ beyond the limit’s text.”). 
174. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 173, at 1450. 
175. Senators Biden and Levin likely fell in this category, as they voted in favor of the bill despite their 
previously expressed concerns about the language embodying the standard of review. 142 CONG. REC. 7,805 
(1996) (recording vote). 
176. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 720 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
177. Id. at 721. 
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signature was of course necessary for the statute’s enactment, his interpretation of 
the provision is entitled to significant weight. 
To be sure, reliance on signing statements in construing statutes may be prob-
lematic in certain contexts.178 A President might, for example, use a signing state-
ment opportunistically to influence the interpretation of a provision of a veto-proof 
statute.179 These concerns are less weighty where, as here, the President’s state-
ment simply confirms the views expressed by the bill’s sponsors and pivotal legis-
lators and is otherwise in accord with its text and legislative history. 
Some (though very little) of the legislative history discussed above was brought 
to the Court’s attention at the end of an amicus brief submitted in Williams.180 
These sources were apparently overlooked by both opinions. The majority opinion 
cribbed from another amicus brief that quoted legislative history suggesting that 
the provision was intended to bar relief for wrong but reasonable errors.181 But 
most of the statements supporting this interpretation came from opponents of such 
a standard and, as discussed above, were refuted by the bill’s sponsors. They reflect 
“loser’s history,” which is widely recognized to be highly unreliable as evidence of 
statutory meaning.182 Had the Court considered the legislative history of § 2254(d) 
(1)’s standard of review, it would have found substantial support for Justice 
Stevens’s interpretation. 
* * * 
In sum, the Williams majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) as barring habeas 
relief for wrong but reasonable state court decisions was unpersuasive. The Court 
relied in part on a generalized congressional purpose to “bring change to the 
field,”183 overlooking the fact that other provisions of the statute sufficiently 
accomplished this goal. The Court’s effort to avoid reading the “unreasonable 
application” clause out of the statute was similarly unpersuasive. The Court also 
overlooked strong evidence that both the Congress and the President understood 
§ 2254(d)(1) as retaining the de novo standard of review. 
At a minimum, the analysis in this Section establishes that the interpretation 
embraced by Justice Stevens and the other concurring Justices was at least equally 
plausible. If so, an additional concern that neither opinion considered should have 
tilted the balance in favor of Justice Stevens’s interpretation; neither opinion 
178. For a discussion of the “function, legality, and value” of presidential signing statements, see Curtis A. 
Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 
(2006). 
179. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward Stiglitz & Barry R. Weingast, Executive Opportunism, Presidential 
Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 95, 96 (2016). 
180. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28 n.50, 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384). 
181. See Brief for the State of California, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21, Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384)). 
182. See Victoria Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History By The Rules, 
122 YALE L.J. 70, 118–28 (2012). 
183. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). 
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adverted to the fact that, as interpreted in Williams, § 2254(d)(1) allocates federal 
jurisdiction in a highly dysfunctional manner. Section III explains the dysfunc-
tional nature of the allocation of jurisdiction effectuated by the Williams interpreta-
tion of AEDPA. Section IV argues that avoidance of such dysfunction is a 
legitimate basis for rejecting an interpretation of a jurisdictional statute. 
III. AEDPA’S FORUM-ALLOCATION FUNCTION 
As interpreted in Williams, § 2254(d)(1) is best understood as a forum-allocation 
rule. The Williams interpretation of AEDPA skirts constitutional objections 
because it does not purport to deny all federal courts the power to review and 
reverse erroneous state court decisions. The Supreme Court retains the power to 
correct such errors through its power to review cases directly from the state courts. 
AEDPA shifts to the Supreme Court the responsibility of reviewing reasonable, 
though possibly erroneous, state court decisions resulting in custody. To undertake 
this review, however, the Supreme Court would have to depart from its current cer-
tiorari policy, under which it would rarely if ever review state court decisions 
alleged to be wrong but reasonable. 
This Section elaborates the forum-allocation function of AEDPA, as the Court 
interpreted the statute in Williams. Part A explains the constitutional significance 
of AEDPA’s retention of Supreme Court jurisdiction to review and reverse wrong 
but reasonable state court decisions resulting in custody. Part B explains the dys-
functional nature of an interpretation of AEDPA as shifting from the lower federal 
courts to the Supreme Court the responsibility of reviewing reasonable but poten-
tially erroneous state court decisions. Part C considers and rejects an alternative 
interpretation of AEDPA as reflecting Congress’s expectation that persons in cus-
tody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions should remain in prison 
(or be executed). Part D considers how the Court might implement AEDPA, under-
stood as a forum-allocation rule. 
A. The Constitutionality of the Williams Construction of § 2254(d)(1) 
In Williams, Justice Stevens intimated that an interpretation of § 2254(d) that 
bars relief when the state court decision resulting in conviction was wrong but rea-
sonable would impinge upon Chief Justice Marshall’s famous dictum that it is the 
province and duty of the courts to say what the law is.184 Scholars have developed 
constitutional objections to such a reading of § 2254(d) in greater detail.185 Some 
184. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (citing Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)). President Clinton also referred to Chief Justice Marshall’s language in his 
AEDPA signing statement. See Presidential Statement, supra text accompanying note 176. 
185. See Joseph M. Brunner, Comment, Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare Decisis: 
AEDPA and Problems for the Article III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307, 307–08 (2006); Mohammed Usman 
Faridi, Comment, Streamlining Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial Review: How 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D) 
(1) Violates the Constitution, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 361, 364 (2006); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, 
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maintain that, if federal courts are given jurisdiction over a case, the Constitution 
requires that they give effect to the Constitution whenever constitutional issues 
arise in the case.186 Some of the scholars who argue that § 2254(d) is unconstitu-
tional acknowledge that Congress would have been free to dispense with habeas ju-
risdiction entirely for persons duly convicted in the state courts.187 But they 
maintain that, as Henry Hart put it, “the Constitution always applies when a court 
is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus.”188 Some federal judges have adopted 
this argument, albeit in dissent.189 
The majority in Williams did not address Justice Stevens’s constitutional con-
cerns. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions unanimously apply the Williams 
standard and affirm that AEDPA bars habeas relief for wrong but reasonable appli-
cations of clearly established federal law.190 Thus, the Court as a whole appears 
unconcerned about the constitutionality of the standard adopted in Williams.191 
Although the Court has never responded to the constitutional arguments, its placid-
ity presumably rests on its belief that Congress’s greater power to deny all habeas 
review in the cases to which § 2254(d)(1) applies includes the lesser power to 
authorize habeas relief only in the most egregious cases. 
If so, the constitutionality of barring relief when the state court decision was 
wrong but reasonable depends on the proposition that federal habeas jurisdiction 
for state prisoners is constitutionally optional. The latter proposition, in turn, 
assumes that the constitutional guarantee of habeas relief does not apply when the 
detainee has received a trial in state court at which he was entitled to have his fed-
eral rights adjudicated and enforced. Under current statutes, a person convicted in 
the state courts is also entitled to seek direct review in the Supreme Court of any 
federal issues that arose in the case.192 
Whether the opportunity for Supreme Court review is constitutionally required 
is a matter of some debate. Some scholars maintain that the Exceptions Clause193 
gives Congress the power to dispense with Supreme Court review of federal issues, 
even constitutional ones.194 Other scholars maintain that Congress may not exclude 
“Some Effectual Power”: The Quality and Quantity of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 814 (1998). 
186. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 185, at 814. 
187. See id. at 775. 
188. Id. at 849 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1393 (1953)). 
189. See, e.g., Evans v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J., dissenting); Crater v. Galaza, 508 
F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Davis v. Straub, 445 F.3d 908, 908–11 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Martin, Jr., J., dissenting). 
190. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 512 (2013); Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 61 (2013); 
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011). 
191. But see Coyle, supra note 2 (noting Justice Sotomayor’s concern). 
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012). 
193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
194. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 
1030, 1038–41 (1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
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Supreme Court review of at least constitutional questions, at least if it has excluded 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over such questions.195 The Court itself has 
spoken broadly of Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause,196 but it has 
never upheld a statute that has excluded all Supreme Court jurisdiction over consti-
tutional questions in particular categories of cases.197 Some Justices have 
expressed strong doubts about the permissibility of curtailing Supreme Court juris-
diction over such questions.198 The Court is sufficiently uncertain about the consti-
tutionality of statutes stripping it of jurisdiction over constitutional questions that it 
has stretched statutory language to obviate that substantial constitutional 
question.199 
If the Exceptions Clause does not authorize Congress to deny the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction over constitutional questions, then it follows that a federal stat-
ute restricting the Supreme Court from reversing state court convictions based on 
wrong but reasonable applications of federal constitutional law would run afoul of 
Article III. Restricting the scope of the Supreme Court’s direct review in such 
cases could not be justified on the theory that Congress has the greater power to 
deny such review altogether. Thus, had AEDPA attempted to curtail the Supreme 
Court’s direct review of state court judgments resulting in criminal convictions in 
the manner that § 2254(d)(1) (as construed in Williams) restricts the federal courts’ 
habeas jurisdiction, the statute would have raised substantial constitutional ques-
tions. If § 2254(d) had also purported to limit the Supreme Court’s power to grant 
relief on direct review, therefore, the Court would presumably have relied on the 
canon of avoidance and adopted the interpretation of that provision favored by 
Justice Stevens. 
The constitutionality of § 2254(d)(1) (or at least the absence of substantial ques-
tions regarding its constitutionality) thus depends crucially on the fact that it does 
not apply to the jurisdiction of all federal courts. Its constitutionality, in other 
words, depends on § 2254(d)(1) functioning as a forum-allocation rule: it allocates  
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 908 (1984); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and 
the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004–06 (1965). 
195. This is the position of Lawrence Sager. See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term— 
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 63–65 (1981). Akhil Amar would require jurisdiction in either the Supreme Court or the 
lower federal courts of all cases arising under federal law, as well as admiralty and public ambassador cases. See 
Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 442, 445 
(1991); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206 (1985). 
196. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-14 (1868). 
197. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654, 660–62 (1996); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 
(1868). 
198. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 666–67 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ.). 
199. See, e.g., Felker, 518 U.S. at 660–62 (majority opinion); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1988). 
But see Webster, 486 U.S. at 611–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the jurisdiction to correct wrong but reasonable state court applications of federal 
law resulting in custody to the Supreme Court on direct review.200 
B. The Dysfunctional Nature of AEDPA’s Allocation of Jurisdiction 
Understood as a forum-allocation rule, AEDPA would cast the Supreme Court 
in a role unfamiliar to it since the early twentieth century, a role that it is ill-suited 
to carry out. Fulfilling an error-correction role with respect to claimed wrong but 
reasonable decisions of the state courts resulting in custody would require that the 
Court alter its approach to exercising its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. 
As discussed in Section I, between 1789 and 1916, the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion over federal questions arising in the state courts was mandatory. Under § 25 of 
the First Judiciary Act, a party who raised a federal question in the state courts and 
lost had a right to obtain Supreme Court review of that question.201 Thus, a person 
convicted of a crime in state court had a right to obtain Supreme Court review of 
any federal defenses raised and decided against her, even if the only question was 
whether the state court had correctly applied clearly established federal law to the 
facts of the case. This mandatory regime began to change in 1916, when Congress, 
for the first time, gave the Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction over some state 
court decisions denying federal rights.202 After 1925, the Court’s mandatory juris-
diction extended only to “state judgments invalidating a treaty or Act of Congress 
or upholding a state statute attacked on federal grounds.”203 Since 1988, the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state court decisions has been entirely 
discretionary.204 
Today, the Supreme Court regards its primary role as ensuring uniformity in the 
application of federal law by resolving conflicts in the interpretation of such law 
among the lower federal courts, among state courts, or between state and federal 
courts. Thus, in selecting cases to review from the state courts, the Court places pri-
mary emphasis on whether ‘‘a state court of last resort has decided an important 
federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of 
last resort or of a United States court of appeals.’’205 In the absence of such a con-
flict, the Court might grant certiorari if a state court “has decided an important 
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or 
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant  
200. Just because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction to review certain federal claims 
does not mean that it is constitutionally required to grant review of such claims. How the Supreme Court should 
exercise its discretion to review wrong but reasonable errors resulting in state custody is discussed infra, Part D. 
201. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85–86 (1789). 
202. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39, Stat. 726–27 (1916). 
203. FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 433; see also Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 237, 43 Stat. 937 (1925). 
204. See 28 U.S.C § 1257 (2012). 
205. See SUP. CT. R. 10(b); see also EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE.: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4017 (2d ed. 2013). 
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decisions of this Court.”206 These last two considerations both focus on the exis-
tence of a question of legal interpretation and its importance. Under its current 
rules, therefore, the Court is highly unlikely to grant certiorari where the petitioner 
is arguing that the state court simply misapplied federal law to the particular facts 
of his case. 
The Court is not precluded from granting certiorari in such a case, and from 
time to time it does summarily reverse a state court decision misapplying a well- 
settled legal rule to particular facts.207 But the Court does so only in the rare cases 
in which the state court’s misapplication of the law has been egregious. This is pre-
cisely the sort of case that is likely to qualify as an “unreasonable application” of 
clearly established law under the Williams Court’s construction of § 2254(d). A 
grant of certiorari with respect to a decision that is alleged to have rested on a 
wrong but reasonable application of clearly established federal law would today 
be virtually unheard of. As interpreted in Williams, therefore, AEDPA denies the 
lower courts the authority to grant habeas relief in precisely the category of cases 
that the Supreme Court today would almost never review. 208 
As the Court’s rules for granting certiorari show, the Supreme Court today does 
not regard its role to be the vindication of federal rights in individual cases. A peti-
tioner’s argument that the state courts have misapplied federal law to the particular 
facts of the case will not persuade the Court to take the case. The Court’s focus on 
conflicts among the lower courts means that the Court will ordinarily allow poten-
tially erroneous decisions to stand while awaiting conflicting decisions from other 
lower courts. And once such conflicts arise, the Court’s choice of a case in which 
to address the conflict will turn on factors that make a particular case a good vehi-
cle for addressing the issue—factors that often have little or nothing to do with the 
strength of a given petitioner’s case on the facts.209 Thus, although the vindication 
206. SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
207. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 277–78 (9th ed. 2007). 
208. In the death penalty context, the Court has granted certiorari and reversed lower federal court decisions 
denying habeas relief on what the dissenting opinion regarded as case-specific grounds. See Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 456–57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the majority noted that “[o]ur duty to search for 
constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case,” id. at 422 (quoting 
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987)), the majority also insisted that “this is not a case of simple error 
correction.” Id. at 422 n.1; cf. id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our duty to administer justice occasionally 
requires busy judges to engage in a detailed review of the particular facts of a case, even though our labors may 
not provide posterity with a newly minted rule of law. The current popularity of capital punishment makes this 
‘generalizable principle,’ . . . especially important.”). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, objected to the Court’s consideration of a “fact-bound claim of error,” noting that, 
“when the petitioner claims only that a concededly correct view of the law was incorrectly applied to the facts, 
certiorari should generally (i.e., except in cases of the plainest error) be denied.” Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 227 (1925)). More recently, however, Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Alito, urged that certiorari be granted in some “utterly fact-bound decisions that present no disputed 
issues of law,” namely in cases in which habeas relief was granted by the lower federal courts in defiance of the 
Williams standard. Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is discussed infra note 234. 
209. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 248–49, 294–95. 
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of federal rights was the principal reason for the Founders’ decision to create fed-
eral courts, and although such vindication was evidently what the First Congress 
viewed as the principal purpose of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,210 
the Supreme Court today clearly does not regard the vindication of federal rights in 
particular cases as its principal role. It regards such vindication as primarily the 
role of the lower federal courts. 
Before the Williams decision, the Court could focus on the resolution of conflicts 
among the lower courts or the resolution of novel questions of federal law of broad 
import without condemning wrongly convicted state prisoners to continued depri-
vation of liberty (or life). As discussed in Section I, federal relief was available in 
either the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts to state prisoners who could 
show that the state court had erroneously applied clearly established federal law. 
Indeed, before Teague v. Lane, such relief was available even if the federal law 
that was misapplied by the state courts was not clearly established at the time the 
conviction became final.211 During the post-Brown/pre-Teague era, the lower fed-
eral courts effectively functioned in habeas cases as “surrogate Supreme 
Courts.”212 During that period, the lower federal courts entertaining habeas peti-
tions performed the role that the Supreme Court had played when its jurisdiction 
over federal questions was mandatory. 
In Teague, the Court held that habeas relief was ordinarily not available if the 
state courts misapplied constitutional principles that were not clearly established at 
the time the conviction became final.213 Post-Teague, the lower federal courts exer-
cising habeas review of state court convictions lost the authority to recognize new 
rules of constitutional law. That authority remained with the Supreme Court on 
direct review (and with the lower federal courts exercising original and appellate 
jurisdiction over federal crimes). But the lower federal courts on habeas remained 
responsible for monitoring state court compliance with well-established rules. The 
division of authority as between the Supreme Court and the federal courts during 
this period remained consistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of its role 
as the resolver of conflicts among the lower courts and of novel questions of law. 
The Supreme Court could focus on these latter tasks, knowing that the lower fed-
eral courts exercising habeas review would monitor state court compliance with 
the principles it articulated. 
Although, after Teague, the lower federal courts exercising habeas review no 
longer functioned as complete surrogates for the Supreme Court, the lower courts 
continued to perform the pre-1916 Supreme Court’s function of correcting 
210. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85–86 (1789) (making Supreme Court review of state 
court decisions mandatory but authorizing such review only if the party relying on federal law lost in the state 
courts). 
211. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299–305 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
212. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
213. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305–10; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 1242 (“[I]n numerous 
subsequent decisions, the Court has endorsed and followed Justice O’Connor’s approach.”). 
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erroneous applications of federal law, if the relevant federal law was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the state court’s decision.214 As the Court itself continued to 
articulate new rules of constitutional law when necessary, the Court apparently 
perceived little need for the lower federal courts to act as a “surrogate” in that 
regard. The need for a surrogate to perform the Court’s error-correction function 
remained, however, as the Court had abdicated that role. With AEDPA (as inter-
preted in Williams), however, the lower federal courts lost the authority to correct 
wrong but reasonable applications of established federal rules, leaving the 
Supreme Court as the only court with such authority. AEDPA (as interpreted in 
Williams) thus challenges the Supreme Court’s conception of its role as excluding 
mere error-correction in a way that the Teague decision did not. 
From the perspective of judicial policy, shifting the error-correction function 
from the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court is obviously problematic. The 
sort of error correction that the Supreme Court is now solely empowered to per-
form (correcting “wrong but reasonable” decisions) is a labor-intensive job, the 
benefits of which accrue to a single litigant. To perform this role, the Court would 
have to divert scarce resources from what it has rightly considered its principal 
function of resolving conflicts and answering novel questions of law. The lower 
federal courts under AEDPA will continue to examine such cases, but they are 
now barred from providing relief if the state court’s error was not unreasonable.215 
It would of course be far more sensible to have the lower courts, rather than the 
Supreme Court, correct the reasonable errors that they will confront in any event as 
they review such cases for reasonableness. In performing the error-correction func-
tion post-AEDPA, the Supreme Court cannot even rely on the lower federal courts 
to play a filtering role, as the Supreme Court’s authority to correct such errors will 
generally have to be performed on direct review, before any collateral review by 
the lower federal courts takes place.216 The correction of wrong but reasonable 
state court decisions will thus have to be performed, if at all, solely by the Supreme 
Court. 
In sum, if interpreted as a forum-allocation rule, AEDPA establishes a highly 
counter-intuitive regime—so counter-intuitive that perhaps the statute (as inter-
preted in Williams) should be understood differently. The next section considers 
other possible interpretations. 
214. See Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 697. 
215. See supra Section III(A). 
216. If collateral review is available in the state courts, the Supreme Court has the power to review federal 
claims arising in such proceedings. But the Supreme Court would be able to grant relief in such cases only if the 
state court denied relief on the merits or if it denied review in circumstances in which the Constitution requires 
such review. For discussion of one such circumstance, see Va´zquez & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 957. 
36                                 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                                 [Vol. 56:1 
C. Alternative Interpretations? 
The alternative to viewing AEDPA (as interpreted in Williams) as a forum- 
allocation rule, and thus as a reason for the Court to alter its certiorari policy, 
would be to treat AEDPA as a basis for leaving such errors uncorrected. 
Proponents of this alternative understanding of AEDPA might note that, since the 
replacement of mandatory review with discretionary review in the Supreme Court, 
the federal courts have never purported to correct all errors of federal law commit-
ted in the state courts. The lower federal courts have always lacked the power to 
review state court decisions in civil cases.217 The same is true for decisions in crim-
inal cases resulting in fines or in short sentences of incarceration.218 Unreviewed 
state court decisions in such cases are entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent lit-
igation in the federal courts.219 The Supreme Court has long been the sole federal 
court with the power to correct errors of federal law committed in the state courts 
in such cases, yet the Court has long exercised its power in the highly selective 
manner described above, ordinarily granting review only to resolve conflicts 
among the lower courts or to resolve important questions of broad applicability.220 
Thus, in civil cases and criminal cases resulting in penalties other than incarcera-
tion, or resulting in incarceration for a short term, errors of federal law committed 
by the state courts routinely remain unreviewed by the federal courts. 
AEDPA, it might be argued, merely establishes the same regime for wrong but 
reasonable state court convictions that has long prevailed for state court decisions 
in civil cases and criminal cases not resulting in lengthy confinement. Indeed, 
under the Williams interpretation of AEDPA, state prisoners have greater access to 
federal courts for error correction than do others who have lost their cases in the 
state courts as a result of errors of federal law. State prisoners, after all, can still 
obtain habeas relief if the state courts erred unreasonably. Civil defendants and 
criminal defendants required to pay a fine or receiving a short sentence lack access 
to federal courts (other than the Supreme Court on certiorari review) even to cor-
rect an unreasonable error. 
In assessing this alternative understanding of AEDPA, it is useful to distinguish 
two versions of the argument. The first is that the Court should continue to deny 
direct review to state prisoners alleging wrong but reasonable violations of federal 
constitutional law because Congress so intended. The second is that the Court itself 
should conclude that adhering to its usual certiorari standards with respect to 
217. See, e.g., District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). 
218. Habeas relief is available only if the petitioner is “restrained of his liberty.” See Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 
28, § 1 (1867) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)). Criminal defendants subjected only to a fine are not 
“restrained of [their] liberty.” Criminal defendants subjected to short sentences will be released before their 
habeas petition makes its way through the courts. 
219. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (as implemented by Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012)); 
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 205–10. 
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petitions by state prisoners alleging wrong but reasonable applications of constitu-
tional law is the most sensible way to balance the relevant considerations given the 
many competing demands on its limited resources. I discuss the first version of the 
argument in the remainder of Part C. I discuss the second version in Part D. 
The first version of the argument holds that the Court should maintain its current 
policy of routinely denying certiorari petitions alleging wrong but reasonable state 
court applications of federal law because Congress did not contemplate that the 
narrowing of habeas jurisdiction be accompanied by a broadening of direct review. 
Rather, Congress intended that persons in custody pursuant to reasonable if possi-
bly erroneous state court decisions simply remain in prison (or be executed). To at-
tribute this intent to Congress is not necessarily to say that Congress intended that 
persons remain in prison even if the state courts in fact committed reversible error. 
Instead, Congress may have believed that the de novo standard of review would 
result in grants of habeas relief to state prisoners whose convictions were not in 
fact erroneous, only some of which would be reversed by the federal courts of 
appeals. Congress, in other words, may have believed that the state courts are more 
likely to decide the federal issues correctly than the lower federal courts on habeas. 
If so, Congress may have intended the Supreme Court to apply the same standard 
in determining whether to grant the certiorari petitions filed by persons convicted 
of crimes in state courts that it applied, pre-AEDPA, to certiorari petitions seeking 
review of federal court of appeals decisions affirming or reversing grants of habeas 
relief to state prisoners. Under that standard, petitions would rarely if ever be 
granted for error-correction purposes. 
Reliance on congressional intent in maintaining the current approach to certio-
rari petitions filed by state prisoners is problematic for multiple reasons. First, if 
Congress had had such an intent with respect to the Supreme Court’s exercise of 
its appellate jurisdiction and had enacted it into law, the resulting statute would 
have raised substantial constitutional questions. Avoidance of such questions 
would have led the Court to reject such an interpretation of the statute if at all 
possible. 
The constitutional problems with the proffered interpretation of AEDPA have 
already been discussed.221 The denial of power to the lower federal courts to grant 
habeas relief for wrong but reasonable state court decisions skirts constitutional 
difficulties because the Supreme Court retains the power to grant relief in such 
cases.222 If Congress had also mandated denial of direct review for that same cate-
gory of cases, the statute would effectively deny access to any federal court to cor-
rect constitutional errors in such cases. Denial of access to all federal courts for a 
given category of constitutional claim would, in the view of many scholars, exceed  
221. See supra Section III(A). 
222. See id. 
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Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause.223 The Court itself has held that 
such denial would raise significant constitutional questions.224 
As discussed above, the Court has in past cases stretched statutory language 
almost to the breaking point to avoid similar constitutional questions.225 In this 
case, avoiding the constitutional question does not require any stretching of statu-
tory language, as AEDPA does not purport to limit the Court’s power to grant 
direct review to state prisoners alleging wrong but reasonable errors. To the con-
trary, AEDPA’s proponents stated that Congress did not and, in their view, could 
not limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over direct appeals by persons convicted 
in the state courts alleging constitutional errors.226 
Indeed, the available evidence suggests that Congress understood that a limita-
tion on the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction would shift responsibility for 
protecting federal rights to the Supreme Court on direct appeal. The Senate debate 
over a rejected amendment that would have denied the lower federal courts the 
power to grant habeas relief in another category of cases shows that Congress 
understood that such a denial would shift the responsibility for safeguarding the 
relevant constitutional rights to the Supreme Court. 
Senator Kyl, one of the principal proponents of AEDPA, offered an amendment 
that would have provided as follows: 
[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to a judgment or order of a State court shall not be entertained by a 
court of the United States unless the remedies in the courts of the State are 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the person’s detention.227 
This proposed amendment generated substantial opposition from legislators who 
regarded it as an evisceration of federal habeas jurisdiction. As Senator Biden put 
the criticism, the amendment “takes away one last shot, as a practical matter, that 
[the state prisoner] has to get before a Federal court.”228 Senator Kyl responded to 
this criticism as follows: 
[W]e do have one shot in the federal system under my amendment. It is 
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. That right exists today, and it could not be 
taken away in our amendment and we do not do that, of course. So if a state 
court prisoner believes that, despite all of the hearings he has gotten in the 
State court system, he still has not gotten a fair shake, . . . he has really two 
things that he can claim — first, the State court system is not fair, and sec-
ondly, he can go to the U.S. Supreme Court and make his final point there.229 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 193–94. 
224. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
226. See infra text accompanying note 229. 
227. 41 Cong. Rec, 15,044 (1995) (text of Sen. Kyl’s proposed amendment). 
228. Id. at 15,048 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
229. Id. at 15,049 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added). 
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Senator Kyl thus recognized the potential constitutional problem with limiting 
Supreme Court review and denied that his amendment would do so. Because 
Supreme Court review remained available, Senator Kyl argued, “there is adequate 
ability to protect the constitutional rights of both State and Federal prisoners.”230 
Senator Biden responded that error correction is properly the role of the lower 
federal courts, not the Supreme Court: 
It is not the Supreme Court’s job to take a detailed look at every State court 
conviction. It is for the Supreme Court to decide weighty issues of Federal 
constitutional law. That is why we have Federal courts and that is why my 
committee spends so much time . . . considering the nomination of Federal 
judges. Our system depends on Federal courts, all the Federal courts, being 
the safeguarders of Federal law.231 
Senator Specter, also in opposition to the amendment, added that, in his view, “it is 
very important to have the kind of detached, objective review that the Federal 
courts give,” noting that “[i]n many of our States we have elected judges.”232 The 
Kyl amendment was ultimately rejected.233 
The debate surrounding the Kyl amendment shows that at least some of 
AEDPA’s sponsors understood that withdrawing jurisdiction over certain claims 
from the habeas courts would shift to the Supreme Court the responsibility to pro-
tect the rights involved. It is true that the Kyl amendment would have gone further 
than the version of § 2254(d)(1) that was eventually adopted. It would have denied 
habeas relief even for unreasonable errors, as long as the state made adequate and 
effective remedies available. In theory, it is possible that Senator Kyl or other 
Senators would not have expected the Supreme Court to review potentially wrong 
but reasonable state court decisions. But there is no direct evidence that any legis-
lator adhered to such a view, most likely because (as discussed in Section II) the 
statute was not understood to remove the power to grant relief for wrong but rea-
sonable errors from the habeas courts. Still, the debate surrounding the rejected 
Kyl amendment indicates that the statute’s supporters understood the forum- 
allocation consequences of a narrowing of the habeas courts’ jurisdiction. 
In the end, AEDPA left the Supreme Court’s power to review reasonable state 
court decisions intact. Even if some legislators understood the statute to take away 
the lower federal courts’ power to grant relief for wrong but reasonable decisions 
and also expected the Supreme Court to continue to deny review in such cases, 
Congress did not enact the latter expectation into law. At most, then, the statute (as 
interpreted in Williams) punts to the Supreme Court itself the question of the state 
courts’ ability and willingness to enforce federal law faithfully. AEDPA thus 
leaves it to the Court itself to determine whether it should respond to the denial to 
230. Id. at 15,052. 
231. Id. at 15,051 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
232. Id. at 15,050 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
233. Id. at 15,066. 
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habeas courts of the power to grant relief for wrong but reasonable errors by state 
courts by altering its approach to certiorari petitions alleging such errors or instead 
by allowing persons in custody pursuant to what the habeas courts would regard as 
wrong but reasonable violations of constitutional law to languish in prison (or 
allow such persons to be executed). The next Part considers how the Court might 
respond to a statute denying the habeas courts power to grant relief in such cases. 
D. Implementing the Forum-Allocation Interpretation 
As discussed in Section I, until the enactment of AEDPA, persons convicted of 
crimes in state courts were entitled to federal court review of questions of constitu-
tional law or application of such law to fact decided against them in the state court. 
When the Court concluded that it could no longer feasibly perform an error-correc-
tion role, it recognized the power and duty of the lower federal courts to afford 
such review via habeas. 
If Congress has now denied the federal habeas courts jurisdiction to grant relief 
for state court constitutional errors deemed “reasonable,” while leaving intact the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review and grant relief in such cases, it seems to 
follow that the Supreme Court should rethink its certiorari policy and at least con-
sider employing its appellate jurisdiction for error-correction purposes, as it did 
earlier in our history. If federal review was necessary to provide an incentive to the 
state courts before AEDPA, and if AEDPA now prevents the habeas courts from 
providing such an incentive, then direct review of such cases in Supreme Court 
would now appear to be necessary for this purpose because the Court is now the 
only federal court that can provide the incentive. 
On the other hand, the reasons that led the Supreme Court to abdicate that role 
in the mid-twentieth Century apply fully today. Indeed, it is even less feasible 
today than in 1953 for the Supreme Court to ensure that state court convictions are 
free of constitutional errors that would warrant reversal on direct appeal.234 At 
best, the Court can hope to employ its appellate jurisdiction to serve an error- 
correction function in a highly selective manner. If the Court cannot hope to fulfill 
234. It is worth noting, however, that Justices Scalia and Alito recently voted to grant certiorari “to perform 
the unaccustomed task of reviewing utterly fact-bound decisions that present no disputed issues of law.” Cash v. 
Maxwell, 126 S. Ct. 611, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Ironically, they advocated 
granting certiorari in such cases to ensure that the Court’s holding in Williams is strictly followed by the federal 
courts of appeals and thus to ensure that the federal courts on habeas do not “deprive [State] courts of that control 
over the State’s administration of criminal justice which federal law assures.” Id. As discussed above, AEDPA 
does not “assure” state courts control over their administration of criminal justice—as interpreted in Williams, 
AEDPA merely disempowers the lower federal courts from monitoring the state courts’ compliance with their 
constitutional obligations. The state courts remain obligated to apply federal law faithfully; state appellate courts 
remain obligated to reverse convictions that rest on a non-harmless error of federal law; and the Supreme Court 
retains jurisdiction to reverse such convictions if the state courts do not. In any event, Justices Scalia and Alito 
appear to believe that performing this “unaccustomed task” is not beyond the Supreme Court’s abilities. Id. 
There is even greater reason for the Justices who dissented from the majority’s construction of § 2254(d)(1) in 
Williams, and those current Justices who would have done so, to vote to grant review in some cases alleging 
wrong but reasonable applications of federal law by state courts. 
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such a role in a comprehensive manner, should it feel any compulsion to adjust its 
certiorari policy in response to Williams? More fundamentally, if the Court has 
come to accept that state court errors of federal law committed in civil cases and in 
criminal cases resulting in fines or short sentences will remain mostly unreviewed 
by federal courts, why should it adjust its certiorari policy to correct such errors in 
criminal cases resulting in lengthy custody? 
To address the last question first, there is an important difference between cases 
for which habeas review is not generally available and those for which it has been 
available until now: the severity of the consequences of error. An erroneous state 
court decision in a civil case, or in a criminal case resulting in a fine, produces an 
erroneous loss of property, usually money. Such losses can be devastating to the 
people involved, but they are different in kind from the consequence of an error in 
a criminal case resulting in incarceration: the convicted defendant’s loss of his lib-
erty (or life). Criminal cases resulting in short sentences result in a loss of liberty, 
but if such cases are not eligible for habeas review, it is because the loss of liberty 
has come to an end. 
On the other hand, the cases for which AEDPA changed the standard of review 
are cases in which a defendant who was, by hypothesis, convicted as a result of a 
non-harmless error of federal law is currently suffering a loss of liberty. The main 
point of habeas review is to end that erroneous deprivation of liberty (or life). 
Denying relief to someone who is currently suffering a loss of liberty as a result of 
an erroneous conviction is properly regarded as far less tolerable than denying 
relief to someone who has erroneously suffered a loss of property. Though the 
denial of relief is regrettable in both sorts of cases, the denial of a federal forum for 
persons currently suffering a loss of liberty (or threatened with the loss of life) as a 
result of an error of federal law is far more difficult to justify on grounds of judicial 
economy. 
It might nevertheless be argued that the plight of the erroneously convicted pris-
oner should not weigh heavily in the Court’s certiorari calculus. First, judicially- 
imposed limits on habeas long predating AEDPA show that the Court has long 
since abandoned any attempt to provide a federal forum for the purpose of ensuring 
that state prisoners’ incarceration is legally correct in some ultimate sense. For 
example, the Court in Teague denied prisoners a federal habeas forum in which to 
argue that their convictions were based on erroneous interpretations of the 
Constitution that had not yet been clearly established at the time of the state court 
proceeding.235 If the Court has been willing to deny a federal forum to state prison-
ers who may well be in custody under an erroneous state court decision just 
because the decision did not contravene constitutional law that was clearly estab-
lished at the time the conviction became final, then why should the Court alter its 
approach to certiorari out of a concern for the prisoner’s plight when she is in 
235. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
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custody pursuant to a reasonable if possibly erroneous state court application of 
clearly established law? 
If one adheres to the notion that courts apply the law but do not make it, then 
Teague does seem to consign some persons erroneously convicted in state court to 
continued incarceration without a realistic prospect of federal court review of the 
constitutional error. But the premise that courts do not make law is contestable, to 
say the least. The Teague decision itself appears to acknowledge that the Court 
makes new law.236 The Court’s holding that most new rules of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure do not apply retroactively can be understood to mean that a state 
court decision that does not comport with a subsequently recognized constitutional 
rule is not for that reason erroneous.237 On this view, the role of the Court is to 
articulate constitutional decision rules that adapt the broad principles in the 
Constitution to current circumstances.238 On this understanding of what it means 
for the Court to articulate a non-retroactively applicable new rule of constitutional 
law, a state court decision applying the decision rules in force at the time of its de-
cision is not necessarily erroneous even if the Court later articulates a decision rule 
that would require a different result. So understood, Teague does not consign erro-
neously convicted state prisoners to continued incarceration. 
A second argument for not giving weight to the plight of someone incarcerated 
pursuant to an erroneous state court decision would question whether the constitu-
tional error bears upon the basic justice of the incarceration. According to this 
argument, many constitutional errors do not call into question the prisoner’s guilt 
of the underlying crime. If the basic justice of the incarceration is our concern, it 
might be argued, we should provide additional layers of review of the factual ques-
tions decided by the state courts rather than focusing on errors of law or mixed 
questions. Yet a free-standing claim of factual innocence is not even regarded as a 
basis for granting habeas relief.239 If the prisoner is guilty and in this sense 
“deserves” his incarceration, the Court need not alter its current policy out of a 
concern for the prisoner. 
It may be true that some constitutional errors do not call into question the 
prisoner’s guilt of the underlying offense. But many constitutional rules appli-
cable in the criminal context are designed to protect the innocent, and with 
respect to such rules it is difficult to know if a constitutional error in a particu-
lar case resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. The possible 
236. Id. (noting that “new constitutional rules” of criminal procedure will not apply to cases that become final 
before “the new rules are announced”). 
237. For discussion of what it means for a new rule to be retroactively applicable, see Va´zquez & Vladeck, 
supra note 46. 
238. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997). 
239. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993). But cf. id. at 417 (reserving question whether “in a 
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of 
a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such 
a claim . . . .”). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). 
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innocence of the prisoner might be a relevant consideration for the Court in 
determining on a case-by-case basis whether to grant a certiorari petition of a 
state prisoner alleging a wrong but reasonable state court error,240 but the pos-
sibility that the petitioner may in fact be guilty does not warrant an across-the- 
board policy of denying review to persons convicted pursuant to wrong but 
reasonable state court decisions. That factual innocence may not be a free- 
standing basis for seeking relief from the federal courts either on direct review 
or on habeas does not mean that the plight of the erroneously convicted is not a 
concern of the federal system. It may merely reflect the belief that federal 
courts do not have a comparative advantage in addressing such issues. 
This leads to the third possible reason why the Court might not want to respond 
to Williams by altering its certiorari policy: the Court may believe that when a state 
court’s decision is reasonable, the state court is as likely to have reached the correct 
result as the federal habeas courts would be. Thus, if the Court, pre-Williams, was 
content to let the habeas courts decide those issues, with only a slim possibility of 
certiorari review, then (on this view) it should be content apply the same standard 
to determine whether to grant certiorari to review state court decisions alleged to 
be erroneous. If we assume that the state courts are as reliable in deciding questions 
of federal law as are the lower federal courts, the chances that the court got the fed-
eral question wrong is the same in the two situations. 
This third argument implicates the long running and probably unresolvable 
debate about the parity of federal and state courts as effective enforcers of federal 
law.241 No doubt the willingness and ability of state courts to enforce federal law 
effectively varies over time, and undoubtedly the state courts as a whole are less 
hostile to federal rights than they once were. Undoubtedly, some state courts are as 
willing and able to enforce federal law faithfully as many federal courts are. But it 
is also likely that other state courts are less reliable protectors of the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants. The Court’s pre-Williams statements that habeas pro-
vided a “necessary incentive” for state courts to enforce such rights indicates that 
the Court had doubts about the parity of state and federal courts in this regard. 
Again, the Court may need to take this factor into account on a case-by-case basis 
in determining whether to grant petitions by persons convicted of crimes in state 
court alleging wrong but reasonable errors of constitutional law. But, if it continues 
to believe that federal monitoring provides a necessary incentive, it should not con-
tinue to adhere to an approach to certiorari that consigns all such persons to contin-
ued imprisonment without the realistic prospect of any federal review. 
240. But cf. infra text accompanying note 242. 
241. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); see also Brett Christopher 
Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 245–52 (1999) (summarizing the conflicting 
parity literature). For the conclusion that the debate concerns an empirical question for which there cannot be a 
reliable empirical answer, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236 (1988). 
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Moreover, the plight of erroneously convicted state prisoners is not the only rea-
son for the Court to alter its certiorari policy in the wake of Williams. The Court 
has reason to be concerned that, in the absence of monitoring by the federal courts, 
state courts might come to regard themselves as free to commit “reasonable” errors 
in applying the Court’s constitutional doctrine. If AEDPA were treated by state 
courts as a green light to commit wrong but reasonable errors, then the Court’s 
precedents relating to constitutional criminal procedure will have ceased to be the 
prevailing law in the states, having been effectively replaced by a watered-down 
version of the same, which might vary from state to state. Concern for the integrity 
of its criminal procedure precedents would thus also support a reconsideration of 
its certiorari policy for direct appeals by state prisoners. 
It is true that the Court does not review state court decisions interpreting federal 
law in the civil cases for error correction purposes. Under its certiorari policy, it 
will ordinarily review such decisions only where there has been a conflict among 
the lower courts or if it deems the issue otherwise to be important. Nevertheless, 
there is some basis for fearing that unmonitored state judges would be more likely 
to disregard federal defenses in criminal cases than in civil cases. Many state 
judges are elected, and such judges might be more reluctant to give effect to federal 
defenses when it favors a criminal defendant than when it would favor a civil de-
fendant. Indeed, this concern would appear to be stronger when giving effect to 
constitutional law would result in a guilty defendant escaping punishment.242 The 
Court’s pre-AEDPA statements that habeas serves as a “necessary incentive” to 
ensure that state courts “toe the constitutional mark”243 indicate that the Court has 
greater doubts about the parity of state courts in giving effect to constitutional 
precedents in the criminal context than in the civil context. 
In sum, AEDPA (as construed in Williams) denies the lower federal courts the 
power to grant relief for wrong but reasonable applications of clearly established 
constitutional law but neither prohibits nor requires the Supreme Court to afford 
such relief on direct review. The combination of the more severe consequence of a 
state court’s error in the criminal context (deprivation of liberty versus deprivation 
of property) and a concern for the integrity of its constitutional civil procedure 
precedents should lead the Court to respond to Williams by taking a fresh look at 
its approach to certiorari petitions filed by state prisoners. Specifically, it is now for 
the Court to consider whether its pre-AEDPA approach to certiorari petitions by 
state prisoners should be modified in light of the fact that it is now the only federal 
court with the power to correct wrong but reasonable applications of federal law 
by the state courts in criminal cases. 
In addressing this question, the Justices will be influenced by their own assess-
ments of the state courts’ ability and willingness to apply federal constitutional law 
correctly in criminal cases without federal court monitoring. Some Justices may be 
242. Cf. supra text accompanying note 240. 
243. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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confident that federal monitoring is unnecessary. They may agree with Justice 
Jackson, who famously stated in his dissent in Brown v. Allen that “we are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”244 More 
recently, the Court in Stone v. Powell noted its “unwillingness to assume that state 
courts now lack appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights.”245 
But the Court’s refusal to expand the Stone exclusion to other constitutional 
claims suggests that the real reason for excluding exclusionary rule claims is the 
prophylactic and non-constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule.246 In a subse-
quent opinion, Justice Powell (the author of Stone) noted the important role of ha-
beas jurisdiction in ensuring that state courts “toe the constitutional mark.”247 The 
plurality in Teague endorsed Justice Powell’s point, and stated, to the same effect, 
that “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and 
appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner con-
sistent with established constitutional standards.”248 Subsequent opinions likewise 
state that habeas jurisdiction is needed to ensure that “state courts conduct criminal 
proceedings in accordance with the Constitution.”249 
Indeed, as discussed in greater detail in Section I, the Court’s adoption of the de 
novo standard of review in Brown v. Allen (possibly earlier) appears to have been a 
direct response to Congress’s replacement of the Court’s mandatory writ of error 
review with discretionary certiorari review, combined with the Court’s realization 
that it could no longer feasibly fulfill an error-correction role. If this realization did 
indeed lead the Court to interpret the habeas statute in a manner that allowed the 
lower federal courts to fulfill the error-correction function in the Court’s stead, and 
if the Court continues to believe that habeas is a “necessary additional incentive” 
for states courts to adhere to federal constitutional law, then Congress’s amend-
ment of the habeas statute to preclude the lower courts from serving that function 
with respect to potentially wrong but reasonable state court decisions should lead 
the Court to reassess its standards for exercising its certiorari jurisdiction. 
Congress would have thrust these questions on the Court had it clearly denied 
the federal courts the jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to state prisoners on the ba-
sis of wrong but reasonable applications of federal law. However, as discussed in 
Section II, it is far from clear that Congress intended to adopt the Williams inter-
pretation of § 2254(d)(1). The discussion in this section adds an important 
244. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Notably, however, only the Chief 
Justice and Justice Thomas signed on to a recent dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia relying on Justice Jackson’s 
opinion in Brown v. Allen. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1942–43 (2013). See also Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 456 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting and endorsing Justice Jackson’s view in 
Brown v. Allen). 
245. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). 
246. See Va´zquez, supra note 9, at 137. 
247. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 
248. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
249. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). 
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additional consideration supporting Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the statute 
and reject the majority’s: the interpretation adopted by the majority entails a highly 
problematic adjustment of the Court’s approach to exercising its discretionary 
review, requiring the Court (or at least placing substantial pressure on it) to expend 
scarce resources to review (or at least to consider reviewing) types of cases it is not 
well-situated to review, diverting scarce resources from the sorts of cases to which 
the Court has been, and should be, devoting its attention. Section IV argues that 
avoiding such a dysfunctional allocation of federal jurisdiction is a proper basis for 
resisting an otherwise plausible interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, and should 
lead the Court to reconsider its interpretation of § 2254(d) in Williams. 
IV. RECONSIDERING WILLIAMS 
The majority in Williams read AEDPA to effectuate what Justice O’Connor had 
previously described as a “far-reaching” change in habeas jurisprudence250—a 
change that she and Justice Kennedy were previously unwilling to effectuate with-
out congressional intervention.251 In other words, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
in Williams subordinated their own views about the proper scope of habeas review 
to those of the legislature. We have already seen that they probably misunderstood 
what Congress sought to accomplish in § 2254(d)(1).252 
Here, I argue that, even if the evidence that Congress intended to deny habeas 
courts the power to grant relief for wrong but reasonable state court decisions had 
been stronger, the Court would have been well justified in resisting that intent in 
the absence of clearer support for it. The Court has never rigidly adhered to a 
“faithful agent” model in construing jurisdictional statutes. In interpreting such 
statutes, the Court has long placed far greater weight on its own views about sound 
policy and considered itself freer to reject the interpretation that would have 
emerged from application of conventional approaches to statutory interpretation. 
More specifically, the Court has strenuously resisted interpretations of jurisdic-
tional statutes that would produce significant misallocations of judicial power. 
Part A shows that the Court has frequently rejected interpretations of jurisdic-
tional statutes that seemed strongly supported by the statute’s text, adopting instead 
the interpretation that cohered best with its own views about the proper allocation 
of judicial resources. In what can best be described as a common-law method of 
construing jurisdictional statutes, it has departed from the statutes’ plain meaning 
and instead erected complex doctrinal edifices bearing little relation to the statutory 
language. In the absence of any change in the statutory language, the Court has 
altered its interpretation of jurisdictional statutes to advance its own views of the 
proper allocation of judicial power in the light of evolving needs. Even when con-
fronted with specific congressional alterations of federal jurisdiction, the Court has 
250. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 297–306 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 306–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
252. See supra Section II. 
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rejected the interpretation most strongly indicated by the statute’s text when that 
interpretation would produce a severely dysfunctional allocation of jurisdiction. 
Part B explains why the Court is justified in resisting interpretations of jurisdic-
tional statutes that would produce severe misallocations of jurisdiction and thus 
undermine the federal judiciary’s ability to fulfill its constitutional functions. 
A. The Court’s Freer Hand in Interpreting Jurisdictional Statutes 
In interpreting jurisdictional statutes, the Supreme Court does not adhere rigidly 
to conventional norms of statutory interpretation. It is not unusual for the Court to 
take substantial liberties with the statutory text or to overlook generally-applicably 
canons of construction to avoid an interpretation that would produce a severe mis-
allocation of jurisdiction as between state and federal courts or among federal 
courts. Sometimes this involves engrafting limitations to broadly-worded jurisdic-
tional grants. Sometimes it involves the adoption of narrow interpretations of juris-
dictional limits that the statutory language appears to impose. Sometimes it 
involves adjusting the interpretation of a jurisdictional statute in the absence of any 
change in the statute’s language to account for changes in other jurisdictional stat-
utes or in the broader legal or societal landscape. 
Subpart (1) offers examples of the Court’s “common law” approach to the inter-
pretation of broadly worded jurisdictional statutes. The Court’s approach to inter-
preting the statutes authorizing federal habeas review of state criminal convictions 
is a good example of the common law approach. I therefore draw liberally in this 
section from the evolution of habeas doctrine, as discussed in Section I and in other 
work. Subpart (2) shows that even with respect to very specific congressional regu-
lation of its jurisdiction, the Court has eschewed the interpretation plainly sup-
ported by statutory text read in light of established canons of interpretation when 
that interpretation would produce a dysfunctional allocation of jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the Court has rejected interpretations even more clearly supported by the 
non-redundancy canon than was its interpretation in Williams. Rather than viewing 
itself as Congress’s faithful agent, the Court often resists congressional interven-
tions in the name of protecting what it regards as its proper constitutional role. 
1. The Court’s Common Law Approach to the Interpretation of Jurisdictional 
Statutes 
One well-known example of the liberties the Court frequently takes in interpret-
ing jurisdictional statutes is its interpretation of the general federal question statute. 
The Constitution extends the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “all cases, in law 
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”253 The Court interpreted  
253. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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this clause very broadly in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.254 There is some 
debate about the precise scope of Osborn’s reading of the constitutional “arising 
under” clause, but no one doubts that it was quite broad.255 According to a widely 
cited formulation, the Court in Osborn read the constitutional clause potentially to 
extend federal jurisdiction to any case in which there is even the “remote possibil-
ity” that an issue of federal law will arise in the case.256 
In 1875, when Congress for the first time conferred a general “arising under” ju-
risdiction on the federal courts, it employed language that closely tracked the paral-
lel clause of the Constitution. The statute gives the federal courts jurisdiction over 
“all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”257 The use of the same language as in Article III suggests that Congress 
intended to confer the entire judicial power over federal questions, an intention 
confirmed by the legislative history, which includes the statement that “[t]his bill 
gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers — nothing more, nothing 
less.”258 Yet, virtually from the start, the Court interpreted the statute to confer sub-
stantially less “arising under” jurisdiction than the constitutional maximum.259 
The Court’s reasons for declining to read the statute to extend the jurisdiction of 
the lower federal scope to the full extent of the Constitution as interpreted in 
Osborn are not difficult to fathom. Had it adopted the Osborn test, the lower fed-
eral courts would have had jurisdiction over any imaginable case that would other-
wise have been adjudicated in the state courts.260 The federalism problems that 
such a reading would have produced are obvious. Perhaps as importantly, adopting 
such a broad interpretation of the statute would have overwhelmed the federal 
courts. It is therefore not surprising that the Court engrafted extra-textual limita-
tions to the statute. It articulated the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, limiting fed-
eral jurisdiction to suits in which an issue of federal law appears on the face of the 
well-pleaded complaint.261 The rule has been defended on grounds of judicial 
administrability: jurisdiction must be determined at the start of a case, and at that 
254. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818–23 (1824). 
255. See generally Carlos M. Va´zquez, The Federal “Claim” in the District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden and 
Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1731, 1735 (2007) (“Marshall’s opinion in Osborn has been read as 
maintaining that a suit arises under federal law for purposes of Article III as long as there is a possibility that a 
disputed question of federal law will arise in the case.”). 
256. See Textile Union Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 482 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) (reading Osborn to hold 
that “Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the 
application of federal law”). 
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
258. 2 CONG. REC. 4,987 (1874). 
259. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492–93. 
260. It is difficult to imagine a case that would fail the Osborn test, if the latter encompasses “any case or 
controversy that might call for the application of federal law.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492. 
261. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908); see RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3566 (2d ed. 2013). 
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point one cannot be certain of the grounds of the defenses that may be raised or of 
any replications.262 
The well-pleaded complaint rule has proved difficult to apply in certain con-
texts. For example, the Court has shifted course a number of times in applying the 
well-pleaded complaint rule to cases in which the plaintiff’s claim is based on a 
state law claim with an “embedded” federal issue.263 In fashioning doctrine for that 
question, the Court has sought to achieve a “common-sense accommodation of 
judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment 
of causation . . . a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the 
web and lays the other ones aside.”264 The Court has also fashioned exceptions to 
the well-pleaded complaint rule, unsupported by statutory text but warranted, in 
the Court’s view, to accommodate exceptional situations requiring access to the 
federal courts.265 
Perhaps the best illustration of the Supreme Court’s common-law approach to 
interpreting jurisdictional statutes is also the most directly relevant to the subject 
of this article: the Court’s shifting interpretation of the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867. As summarized in Section I,266 this Act conferred on the federal courts the 
power to grant habeas relief “in all cases where any person may be restrained of 
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of 
the United States . . . .”267 The statutory language has not changed, yet the Court 
has revised the scope of available habeas review numerous times based on its own 
views about the proper allocation of jurisdiction as between the lower federal 
courts and the Supreme Court, sometimes in the light of changes in other jurisdic-
tional statutes. 
At the time of the statute’s enactment, persons convicted of crimes in state court 
had a right to review in the Supreme Court of the federal issues decided against 
them. As already discussed, the Court held that, in the absence of peculiar urgency 
warranting an exception from the exhaustion requirement, direct review in the 
Supreme Court was the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner convicted in state 
court claiming constitutional error.268 This limitation was understood to be consist-
ent with the statutory language on the theory that someone convicted by a court 
with jurisdiction is not “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea-
ties of the United States” as long as the rendering court had jurisdiction over the  
262. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 784. 
263. Compare Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813–14 (1986), with Grable & Sons 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005). 
264. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936), quoted in Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813–14 and 
Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313. 
265. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (reaffirming and broadening the 
“complete preemption” exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule). 
266. And explained in greater detail in Va´zquez, supra note 9. 
267. Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 28, § 1 (1867) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)). 
268. See supra Section I(B). 
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person and subject matter.269 That the court may have committed an error in the 
interpretation or application of the Constitution did not render the custody itself 
unconstitutional.270 The writ of error exclusivity doctrine strained even this “juris-
dictional” reading of the 1867 statute, however, as the Court applied the doctrine 
to preclude habeas relief in the lower federal courts even when the prisoner alleged 
that the state court lacked jurisdiction.271 As discussed in Section I, it did so in 
order to advance its own view that direct review in the Supreme Court review was 
the more appropriate mechanism for protecting the federal constitutional rights of 
persons convicted of crimes in state court. 
As discussed above, Professor Liebman has argued that the writ of error exclu-
sivity doctrine evaporated when the statutes governing direct review in the 
Supreme Court were amended to eliminate mandatory review of claims from the 
state courts in most cases.272 I have alternatively argued that, with respect to claims 
by state prisoners, the Court gradually expanded the scope of habeas review as it 
came to recognize that it could no longer fulfill an error-correction role.273 Either 
way, the Court expanded the availability of habeas jurisdiction in the lower federal 
courts without a corresponding change in the language of the habeas statute, based 
on its perception of a need for a right of review in the lower federal courts to com-
pensate for the absence of direct review in the Supreme Court. 
The Court in Brown v. Allen definitively rejected the idea that it is ordinarily 
only for the Supreme Court to review state criminal convictions. In explaining the 
Court’s holding, Justice Frankfurter claimed that the Court was merely giving 
effect to the habeas statute as Congress had written it in 1867: 
It is for the Congress to designate the member in the hierarchy of the federal 
judiciary to express the higher law. The fact that Congress has authorized dis-
trict courts to be the organ of the higher law rather than a Court of Appeals, or 
exclusively this Court, does not mean that it allows a lower court to overrule a 
higher court. It merely expresses the choice of Congress how the superior 
authority of federal law should be asserted.274 
In light of the long period in which the statute had been read more narrowly, it is 
difficult to take seriously Justice Frankfurter’s disavowal of the Court’s own 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
270. For the view that this interpretation of the statutory language is the only plausible one, see Bator, supra 
note 26, at 474–78; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103–07 (1959). 
271. See, e.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1898). 
272. See supra Section I(B). 
273. See id. 
274. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510. (1953); see also id. at 499–500 (“It is not for us to determine whether 
this power should have been vested in the federal courts. As Mr. Justice Bradley, with his usual acuteness, 
commented not long after the passage of that Act, ‘although it may appear unseemly that a prisoner, after 
conviction in a state court, should be set at liberty by a single judge on habeas corpus, there seems to be no 
escape from the law.’”). 
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agency in the matter. If Congress in 1867 did designate the district courts as the 
“organ of higher law,” then the Court’s articulation of an all-but categorical bar on 
the lower courts’ power to grant habeas relief—a bar that prevailed for much of the 
nineteenth century and at least through the early part of the twentieth century— 
would be hard to defend. It seems likely that Justice Frankfurter was projecting to 
Congress his own views about the need for federal review of these cases, a view 
reflected in his observation in Brown that: 
Unfortunately, instances are not wanting in which even the highest State 
courts have failed to recognize violations of these precepts that offend the lim-
itations which the Constitution of the United States places upon enforcement 
by the States of their criminal law.275 
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts later narrowed the availability of habeas relief 
in some respects. Again, the Court adjusted its interpretation of the statute without 
any relevant intervening change in the statutory language. It relied instead on its 
views regarding the proper allocation of power as between the lower federal courts 
and the Supreme Court.276 As already explained, by the time of AEDPA’s enact-
ment, the Court had concluded that habeas review in the lower federal courts pro-
vided a necessary incentive for state courts to “toe the constitutional mark.”277 
Without such an incentive, the Court appears to have concluded, state courts could 
not be counted on to apply the Court’s criminal procedure precedents faithfully. 
In sum, the whole history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the habeas 
statute reflects the Court’s adjustment of its interpretation of the statute’s 
unchanged text to give effect to its own views of the proper allocation of jurisdic-
tion as between itself and the lower federal courts in the light of its own conviction 
of the need for federal review of state court decisions resulting in custody. In view 
of this history, the subordination by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy of their own 
convictions regarding the need for habeas review of state criminal convictions in 
favor of what they took, from ambiguous evidence, to be Congress’s preferences 
stands out as aberrational. 
2. Supreme Court Resistance of Severe Misallocations of Jurisdiction 
Nor was the approach taken by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy any less aberra-
tional because the statute they were construing purported to impose a very specific 
limitation on federal court jurisdiction. The freer hand the Supreme Court takes in 
interpreting jurisdictional statutes is evident not just in its interpretation of broadly 
worded statutes such as those discussed in the previous Section.278 The Court has 
also departed from its usual approach to statutory interpretation when confronted 
275. Id. at 511 (citing De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561(1947)). 
276. For a detailed discussion, see Va´zquez, supra note 9. 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 247–49. 
278. See supra Section IV(A)(1). 
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with statutes making quite specific changes in the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Here, too, the Court has resisted interpretations apparently required by the text, 
adopting instead an interpretation that produced an allocation of jurisdiction more 
in line with its assessment of the need for federal review or that avoided severe 
problems of judicial administration. 
As examples of the Court’s resistance to problematic interpretations of specific 
jurisdictional provisions, this section discusses a decision interpreting the “pro-
viso” of the statute addressing its writ of error review and a decision construing the 
effect of the proviso’s repeal. These decisions properly insist that Congress speak 
clearly if it wishes to foist on the federal courts a jurisdictional regime that compro-
mises their ability to fulfill their proper functions. 
Although the Court has not articulated this resistance as an interpretive canon in 
its own right, I posit such a canon as the best explanation of the Court’s interpreta-
tions of these (and other) jurisdictional statutes. The canon might be considered a 
specific application of the canon of avoidance of constitutional questions, based on 
the assumption that a statute that significantly impairs the federal courts’ ability to 
perform its proper functions raises substantial constitutional questions. I argue 
here, however, that the canon is best understood as a distinct quasi-constitutional 
clear-statement rule.279 
a. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 addressed the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to review decisions of the state courts.280 It authorized review by 
writ of error where the state court decided an issue of federal law against the party 
claiming a right under such law.281 The final sentence of § 25 [hereinafter “the pro-
viso”] provided that “no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of re-
versal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, 
and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construc-
tion of the [federal law] in dispute.”282 Despite the statutory text purporting to limit 
the Supreme Court’s review to the issues of federal law in dispute, the Supreme 
Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee construed the proviso to permit review of cer-
tain questions of state law.283 
The plaintiff in error in Martin claimed title to some land in Northern Virginia, 
tracing his title to that of a British subject who had previously owned the land.284 
He relied in part on the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, which provided in 
279. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 595, 595 & n.4 (1993). 
280. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat. 85–87 (1789). 
281. See id. 
282. See id. at 86–87. 
283. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357–59 (1816). 
284. Id. at 311; Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603, 607 (1812). 
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part that there should be “no future confiscations” of the property of British sub-
jects.285 The plaintiff in error did not dispute the state court’s construction of the 
treaty.286 The state court did not deny that the treaty prohibited confiscations of the 
property of British subjects after the treaty’s entry into force.287 It held, instead, 
that the Commonwealth of Virginia had confiscated the land before the treaty had 
entered into force.288 Thus, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the only disputed 
question concerned interpretation of Virginia law: Did Virginia statutes effect a 
completed confiscation of the land prior to the treaty’s entry into force in 1783? 
The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the land had been confiscated under 
Virginia law prior to that date.289 The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to 
review that question of Virginia law, notwithstanding the proviso in § 25, and it 
reversed the Virginia Court of Appeals on that question of Virginia law.290 
In construing the proviso, the Court departed from the plain text of the statute on 
the basis of its understanding of the purposes of its appellate jurisdiction. The 
Court, speaking through Justice Story, held that, where a party relies for his title on 
the treaty, and the state court’s decision is against that title, the Court has the juris-
diction to review the state court’s decision against the title, even if the state court 
decided against the title on grounds of state law.291 If otherwise construed, the 
Court wrote, § 25 “will be wholly inadequate for the purposes which it professes to 
have in view, and may be evaded at pleasure.”292 According to the Court, the pro-
viso applied only to issues of state law that are completely independent of the 
claimed title protected by federal law.293 
Justice Johnson, who disagreed with the majority’s construction of Virginia law, 
agreed that the Court had jurisdiction to review that question.294 He too relied on 
the need to advance the broader purposes of § 25.295 Inquiry into the plaintiff in 
error’s title under Virginia law ‘‘must, in the nature of things, precede the consider-
ation how far the law, treaty and so forth, is applicable to it; otherwise an appeal to 
this court would be worse than nugatory.’’296 
285. See Fairfax’s Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) at 608–09, 614. 
286. Id. at 608. 
287. See id. at 612, 616. 
288. Id. at 614–15. 
289. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 306–07. 
290. Id. at 357–59, 362. 
291. Id. at 357–59. 
292. Id. at 357. 
293. Id. at 359. 
294. Id. at 368–69 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
295. Id. at 369 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
296. Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603, 632 (1812) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see 
also Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 370 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“And if the contrary doctrine be assumed, what 
is the consequence? This court may then be called upon to decide on a mere hypothetical case—to give 
construction to a treaty without first deciding whether there was any interest on which that treaty, whatever be its 
proper construction, would operate.”). 
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Neither Justices Story nor Johnson elaborated on why the purposes of the statute 
called for review of the question of state law in the case, but they appear to have 
feared that a state court hostile to the federal right could easily defeat the right 
through a tendentious resolution of the antecedent state-law question. The Court’s 
holding was certainly a defensible one, but it is difficult to square with the lan-
guage of the proviso. The Court’s construction of the proviso is thus an early exam-
ple of the Court’s resistance to a textual reading of a jurisdictional statute that 
would undermine the Court’s ability to serve its intended role.297 
b. Murdock v. City of Memphis 
In 1867, Congress reenacted § 25 with some changes.298 Among the changes 
was the omission of the proviso just discussed. The question before the Court in 
Murdock v. City of Memphis was whether Congress’s repeal of this proviso had the 
effect of authorizing the Supreme Court to review nonfederal questions arising in 
cases falling within the scope of § 25.299 The Court in Martin had stated that, in the 
absence of the proviso, jurisdiction to review even wholly independent questions 
of state law “would . . . have unquestionably attached to the court.”300 It would 
seem to follow that the repeal of the proviso would “unquestionably” have 
extended the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to such independent questions of state 
law. Nevertheless, the Court in Murdock held that the repeal did not have that 
effect, and that the Court’s jurisdiction continued to extend only to the federal 
questions (and, presumably, although the Court did not say so, to issues of state 
law antecedent to the federal right).301 The Court based this holding on its own 
assessment of the needs of judicial administration.302 
The plaintiffs in error in Murdock claimed some land that had been conveyed by 
their ancestors to the City of Memphis for the construction of a naval yard.303 The 
City of Memphis conveyed the land to the federal government, which used the 
land as a naval yard for a time.304 The federal government later determined that it 
no longer required the land for that purpose, and it conveyed the land back to the 
city by an act of Congress “for the use and benefit of said city.”305 The plaintiff in 
error claimed that the use of the land as a naval yard was a condition of the initial 
297. Justice Story’s majority opinion did rely on the text of § 25, specifically its conferral of jurisdiction 
“where is drawn in question the construction of a treaty, and the decision is against the title set up by the party.” 
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 358. But the proviso purports to limit review in such cases to the construction of 
the federal law in dispute. Neither Story nor Johnson made a serious attempt to square the Court’s holding with 
that language. 
298. See Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 386–87 (1867). 
299. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 616 (1874). 
300. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 359. 
301. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 619, 626–28. 
302. See infra text accompanying notes 317–18. 
303. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 637. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
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conveyance and that, now that the land was not being used for that purpose, the 
city was obligated to reconvey it to them.306 
Under § 25, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review Murdock’s federal 
claim, viz., whether the federal statute reconveying the land to the city gave 
Murdock a right to the land. Murdock’s federal claim was exceedingly weak, as 
the statute provided that the land was being conveyed to the city “for the use and 
benefit of said city,” but it was a federal claim that Murdock had raised and that the 
state courts had decided against him. Under § 25 as originally enacted, the 
Supreme Court’s role would have been limited to reviewing the state court’s deci-
sion of that (easy) federal question. But Murdock argued that the repeal of § 25’s 
proviso had the effect of authorizing Supreme Court review of all other issues in 
the case, including the much more substantial nonfederal issues implicating the 
law of contracts and trusts.307 
Had the Court applied conventional approaches to statutory interpretation in 
deciding the jurisdictional question, it would have endorsed the plaintiff in error’s 
interpretation of the statute. First, as noted, the Court had already concluded that, 
without the proviso, the Court’s jurisdiction under § 25 would “unquestionably” 
have extended to state law questions.308 Stare decisis thus strongly supported 
Murdock’s argument. Moreover, a well-accepted principle of statutory interpreta-
tion teaches that “[s]tatutory amendments are meant to have real a substantial 
effect.”309 The Court’s failure to apply that canon of construction offers an impor-
tant contrast to the Williams decision, as the canon about the effect of amendments 
is a close cousin of the non-redundancy canon applied by the Court in Williams. 
(The latter canon counsels courts to avoid interpretations that would render a por-
tion of the language of a statute superfluous; the former canon counsels the avoid-
ance of an interpretation that would render the repeal of language superfluous.) 
In a nod to the “faithful agent” conception of the judicial role in interpreting stat-
utes, the Court considered whether Congress had actually intended to broaden the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to state law issues decided by the state 
courts. It concluded that, while some members of Congress may well have 
intended to do so, others may have voted to repeal the proviso because they 
believed that the Court’s jurisdiction would be limited to the federal question even 
without the proviso.310 That may well be true, but the point of the non-redundancy 
canon (and its close cousin regarding the effect of repeal of statutory language) is 
to obviate that question in the absence of affirmative evidence that legislators 
believed the repeal of the language would have no effect. In Murdock, the Court’s 
speculation about the probable intent of legislators trumped the canon. Moreover, 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 618. 
308. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 359 (1816). 
309. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 414 & n.55 (citing cases). 
310. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 618–19. 
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scholars who have looked at the question have concluded that the Reconstruction 
Congress of 1867 likely did intend to extend the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, as 
Murdock argued.311 
Far from giving effect to the statutory language, the Court proceeded to 
“criticize[]” it.312 The Court rejected the interpretation supported by the text and 
by likely congressional intent, adopting instead an interpretation that accorded 
with its own view of the (lack of) need for Supreme Court review of state-law 
questions313 and, importantly for present purposes, its concerns about the disas-
trous effect that a literal interpretation would have had on judicial administration. 
The significant problems that would have been posed for the Court’s ability to do 
its work had the Court adopted a literal interpretation of the statute were, in the 
words of counsel for Memphis, “too obvious to require to be presented.”314 Recall 
that writ of error review was mandatory, not discretionary. If the presence of a fed-
eral issue in the case, even one as frivolous as the one raised by Murdock, were to 
have the effect of triggering the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review every issue 
in the case, then the Supreme Court’s caseload would have been multiplied 
several-fold. The Court in Murdock wrote at length about this problem: 
[I]f when we once get jurisdiction, everything in the case is open to re-exami-
nation, it follows that every case tried in any State court, from that of a justice 
of the peace to the highest court of the State, may be brought to this court for 
final decision on all the points involved in it. That this is no exaggeration let 
us look a moment.315 
The Court proceeded to describe at length the “burden” imposed on the Court by 
the “abuse” of litigants manufacturing frivolous federal questions just to get into 
federal court.316 It then noted: 
If the temptation to do this is so strong under the rule of this court for over 
eighty years to hear only the Federal question, what are we to expect when, by 
merely raising one of those questions in any case, the party who does it can 
bring it here for decision on all the matters of law and fact involved in it. It is 
to be remembered that there is not even a limitation as to the value in contro-
versy in writs to the State courts as there is to the Circuit Courts; and it follows 
that there is no conceivable case so insignificant in amount or unimportant in 
principle that a perverse and obstinate man may not bring it to this court by 
the aid of a sagacious lawyer raising a Federal question in the record—a point 
311. See William M. Wiecek, Murdock v. Memphis: Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial 
Federalism, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 223, 232–33 
(Maeva Marcus, ed., 1992) (citing work by Charles Warren, Felix Frankfurter, James Landis, and Martha Field). 
312. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 625. 
313. Id. at 626 (“No . . . reason nor any necessity exists for the decision by this court of [nonfederal] 
questions . . . .”). 
314. Id. at 613. 
315. Id. at 628. 
316. Id. at 629. 
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which he may be wholly unable to support by the facts, or which he may well 
know will be decided against him the moment it is stated. But he obtains his 
object, if this court, when the case is once open to re-examination on account 
of that question, must decide all the others that are to be found in the record.317 
The Court’s rejection of a literal interpretation of the statute was also based on 
its concern about the radical alteration it would have caused to the state courts’ 
control over state law: 
The State courts are the appropriate tribunals . . . for the decision of questions 
arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise. And it is not 
lightly to be presumed that Congress acted upon a principle which implies a 
distrust of their integrity or of their ability to construe those laws correctly.318 
But the Court was evidently more concerned with the effect the literal interpreta-
tion would have had on its own work. As legal historian William Wiecek has 
written: 
If the Court had accepted the jurisdiction potentially proffered by Section 2, it 
would have been deluged by an appalling increase in cases coming up to it 
from the state courts. [Justice] Miller’s warning about manufactured federal 
questions was not hyperbole, but sober truth. The Court was already feeling 
itself overworked, and the justices were leery of taking on new responsibil-
ities, to say nothing of the freshet of appeals that would have descended on it 
had Murdock been decided the other way.319 
Murdock thus provides a clear precedent for the Court’s resistance of an interpreta-
tion of a statute strongly supported by the canon against superfluities on the ground 
that the interpretation would produce a highly dysfunctional allocation of federal 
jurisdiction. 
B. In Defense of Resistance of Jurisdictional Misallocations 
The foregoing cases show that the Court departs from the faithful agent model 
of statutory interpretation in interpreting jurisdictional statutes by resisting inter-
pretations that would produce a dysfunctional allocation of judicial power even 
when such an interpretation is supported by text, read in the light of traditional can-
ons of construction. I am hardly alone in noting that the Court frequently departs 
from the faithful agent model of statutory interpretation in construing jurisdictional 
statutes. Some scholars regard such departures as defensible and in any event 
unavoidable.320 Other scholars condemn such departures.321 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 626. 
319. Wiecek, supra note 311, at 242–43. 
320. See, e.g., David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985). 
321. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1890–91 (2008). 
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This Part argues that such resistance is proper for two reasons. First, the law of 
federal jurisdiction is notoriously complex and, as a result, it will frequently be the 
case that Congress did not anticipate, much less intend, the problems that the Court 
is resisting. Second, in enacting a jurisdictional statute, Congress is regulating the 
powers of a coordinate branch of government, a branch that is in some respects a 
check on it. Much has been written about the constitutional limits on Congress’s 
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Whatever those limits may 
be, the Court is on firm ground in at least insisting on clear evidence of congres-
sional intent before interpreting a statute in a way that undermines its ability to per-
form its proper constitutional functions. A clear statement rule that accomplishes 
that goal can therefore be said to have constitutional underpinnings. 
1. The Complexity of the Law of Federal Jurisdiction 
As is well known, the issues arising in the area of federal jurisdiction can be tre-
mendously complex. Congress lacks the expertise to anticipate and adequately 
address the complexities that its occasional interventions into this field can pro-
duce. Indeed, Congress rarely attempts such interventions. Its legislation in the 
area is often broadly worded, leaving much to be inferred. As shown by the exam-
ples discussed above, such statutes can potentially cause enormous problems if 
read literally.322 
When Congress does attempt to micromanage an aspect of federal jurisdiction, 
its interventions will often raise many difficult issues, again potentially causing 
substantial problems for judicial administration if interpreted pursuant to conven-
tional methods of statutory interpretation. It is safe to assume that, in most cases, 
Congress does not anticipate, let alone intend, the problems its statutes produce for 
the judiciary. For this reason, the Court is justified in insisting on clearer evidence 
than usual that Congress intended to produce such problematic results. 
AEDPA is one of Congress’s rare forays into the minutiae of federal jurisdiction 
and it provides us with numerous examples, quite apart from the issue of deference 
under § 2254(d)(1), of likely unanticipated problems produced by a literal interpre-
tation.323 The enormously complex problems with AEDPA sometimes result from 
the plain text of the statute, yet it is unlikely that Congress anticipated the prob-
lems, much less that it intended to produce them. By contrast, with respect to the 
question that is the subject of this article, the problem does not result from a literal 
interpretation of the words Congress enacted. They result instead from a failure to 
apply the statute as written. The Court’s departure from the statute’s plain meaning 
was grounded in a canon of construction that the legislators are very unlikely to 
have had in mind when they chose the language.324 Indeed, as discussed in Part II, 
the pivotal legislators appear to have recognized that the “contrary to” and 
322. See supra Section IV(A)(2). 
323. For a discussion on just one example, see Va´zquez & Vladeck, supra note 46, at 954–57. 
324. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 72, at 907. 
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“unreasonable application” standards both permit relief for erroneous state court 
decisions. Resisting the dysfunctional allocation of federal jurisdiction produced 
by the Williams interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) would thus not even have required a 
departure from the faithful agent model of statutory interpretation. It would at 
most have required a departure from a canon of construction designed more to 
guide congressional drafting than to reflect congressional intent. 
2. The Propriety of Resistance 
Even when an interpretation of a jurisdictional statute finds stronger support in 
the text of the statute, the courts are well justified in resisting the interpretation if it 
would produce a dysfunctional allocation of judicial power. When Congress enacts 
a jurisdictional statute, it addresses the powers and duties of a coordinate branch of 
government. Because the judiciary serves in some respects as a check on the legis-
lative branch, the courts act appropriately when they resist interpretations of stat-
utes that would undermine their ability to carry out their proper functions. 
The scholarship on the scope of Congress’s power to regulate the federal courts 
is legion. Most of this scholarship has focused on the constitutionality of stripping 
the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain classes of cases.325 Far less attention 
has been paid to the problems that would be created for the federal courts if 
Congress were to give those courts too much jurisdiction of the wrong kind. 
Overburdening the federal courts with the wrong kinds of cases reduces the amount 
of time and attention such courts can devote to the right kind of cases, even if the 
types of cases over which the courts are given jurisdiction fall within the federal 
judiciary’s Article III powers. The examples discussed above of judicial resistance 
to problematic interpretations of jurisdictional statutes raised problems of this 
sort.326 A literal interpretation of the general federal question statute would have 
overwhelmed the federal courts with cases not raising federal claims or requiring 
the application or interpretation of federal law. Interpreting the repeal of § 25’s 
proviso to extend the Supreme Court’s writ of error jurisdiction to every nonfederal 
question in the case would have overburdened the court with the decision of ques-
tions not implicating any discernable federal interest.327 
Indeed, at the very beginning of the Court’s history, Chief Justice Jay under-
stood that accepting the President’s invitation to take on questions of the wrong 
sort would interfere with the Court’s effectiveness in functioning as a check on the 
other branches.328 The President had sought the Court’s assistance to resolve ques-
tions regarding the law of neutrality. Jay politely declined, noting that “the three 
branches of government” were “in certain respects checks upon each other.”329 
325. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, Chapter IV. 
326. See supra Section IV(A)(2). 
327. See supra Section IV(A)(2)(b). 
328. See FALLON ET AL, supra note 6, at 52. 
329. Id. 
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Jay’s concern was not only, or even primarily, that accepting the President’s invita-
tion would distract the Justices from their proper functions. Rather, the episode is 
an early recognition that the Court’s ability to serve as a check on the other 
branches might be undermined by demanding too much of the courts as well as by 
giving them too little power. 
The rule against advisory opinions is now understood to reflect constitutional 
limitations. If Congress gives the Court jurisdiction over cases falling outside the 
judicial power as defined by Article III, the Court can and should resist by finding 
the statute unconstitutional. If a jurisdictional statute raises potential constitutional 
difficulties of this sort, the Court can resist by applying the canon of avoidance.330 
If a statute unambiguously gives the federal courts jurisdiction over cases undoubt-
edly within the federal judicial power under Article III, the Court may have no 
option but to accept the jurisdiction even if, in the Court’s view, doing so would 
undermine its ability to focus effectively on cases that are more important from the 
perspective of serving as a check on the other branches. As discussed in Section II, 
§ 2254(d)(1) is not unambiguous. 
If a statute clearly conferring jurisdiction over a class of cases within the federal 
judicial power imposes a severe burden from this perspective, the Court may well 
be justified in declining the jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. But declining ju-
risdiction on such grounds would be unprecedented and controversial. Insisting on 
a clear statement before adopting an interpretation that would produce such prob-
lems, on the other hand, would not be unprecedented. Both Mottley and Murdock, 
I have argued, are examples of such resistance.331 Indeed, such resistance reflects 
the Court’s assumption that Congress does not mean to interfere inappropriately 
with the courts’ proper role. The Court is accordingly on solid ground when it 
rejects an interpretation of a jurisdictional statute that would produce a dysfunc-
tional allocation of jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement from Congress 
that that was its intent. A clear statement rule of this sort is properly grounded in 
the constitutional separation of powers. 
As detailed in Section III, the Williams interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) produces a 
dysfunctional allocation of judicial power. It shifts from the lower federal courts to 
the Supreme Court the responsibility of granting relief from wrong but reasonable 
state court decisions resulting in custody. The alternative of continuing to deny 
review of such cases would properly be regarded by the Court as unacceptable, 
both because it results in the continued deprivation of liberty for prisoners whose 
convictions were erroneous under the Court’s own precedents and because it 
threatens the effectiveness of those precedents. But reviewing such cases burdens 
the Court with an error-correction function that it is ill-suited to carrying out and 
330. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (“If a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which [a serious doubt of constitutionality] may be avoided, a court should adopt that construction.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
331. See supra text accompanying note 261 and Section IV(A)(2)(b). 
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would distract it from deciding the questions of broad significance that the Court 
rightly regards as its far more important function. The Court would accordingly 
have been on firm ground in resisting such an interpretation even if it had been 
more strongly supported by the statute’s text. A fortiori, the Court should resist 
such an interpretation when the statute’s text provided such weak support for it. 
It is not too late to shift course. Although the Court ordinarily adheres to its 
precedents most rigidly when it has interpreted statutes,332 the concerns discussed 
in this section are of a quasi-constitutional nature. With respect to the Williams 
precedent, moreover, reliance interests do not weigh strongly in favor of retaining 
the majority’s problematic interpretation of § 2254(d). Indeed, the possibility that 
state courts may come to rely on the Williams holding by treating it as a green light 
to commit reasonable errors of federal law is one of the dangers to be avoided by 
overruling Williams. The Court should revisit its interpretation of 2254(d) and 
adopt the minority’s reading of that statute at its earliest opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court departed from the text of § 2254(d)(1) 
in holding that the provision denies the lower federal courts the power to grant ha-
beas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court 
decisions. The majority relied instead on its perception of a generalized congres-
sional purpose to cut back on habeas relief and on the non-redundancy canon of 
statutory construction. On both scores, the minority opinion had the better argu-
ment. Additionally, both opinions overlooked legislative history strongly support-
ing the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to change the standard of 
review that had existed since at least 1953, probably earlier. The case for reading 
the provision as requiring a departure from the well-established standard of review 
was thus remarkably weak. 
Even if the case had been stronger, however, the Court should have rejected 
such a reading for an additional reason: under the majority’s interpretation, the pro-
vision functions as a highly dysfunctional forum-allocation rule. AEDPA (as con-
strued in Williams) does not prohibit all federal courts from granting relief to state 
prisoners convicted pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions. Had it 
done so, it would have raised serious constitutional issues. Instead, the provision 
leaves it to the Supreme Court to review state court criminal convictions for wrong 
but reasonable errors. 
This allocation of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts is highly dysfunctional. Although the Court performed an error-correction 
role with respect to state-court decisions during much of our history, today it lacks 
the resources to fulfill such a role. Precedent and principle support judicial resist-
ance to interpretations of jurisdictional statutes that produce such dysfunctional 
332. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
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allocations of judicial power. The need to resist such dysfunction should have 
swayed the Justices to adopt the interpretation favored by the minority in that case. 
The Court should reverse Williams at its earliest opportunity. Pending such reversal, 
the Court should grant review of at least some wrong but reasonable state court con-
victions in order to protect its precedents requiring the reversal of convictions 
infected with non-harmless constitutional errors and to vindicate the liberty interests 
of state prisoners who would not be in custody had those precedents been properly 
applied.  
2019]                                      AEDPA AS FORUM ALLOCATION                                      63 
